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THE NATURE OF FAMILY, THE FAMILY OF NATURE: THE
SURPRISING LIBERAL DEFENSE OF THE TRADITIONAL
FAMILY IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT
John Witte, Jr.*
ABSTRACT
This Article shows that many Enlightenment liberals defended traditional
family values and warned against the dangers of sexual libertinism and marital
breakdown. While they rejected many traditional teachings in their
construction of modern liberalism, Enlightenment liberals held firmly to
classical and Christian teachings that exclusive and enduring monogamous
marriages are the best way to ensure paternal certainty and joint parental
investment in children who are born vulnerable and dependent on their
parents’ mutual care. Stable marital households, furthermore, are the best way
to ensure that men and women are treated with equal dignity and respect, and
that husbands and wives, and parents and children, provide each other with
mutual support, protection, and edification throughout their lifetimes. The
positive law of the state must not only support the marital family but also
outlaw polygamy, fornication, adultery, and “light divorce” that violate the
other spouse’s natural rights as well as desertion, abuse, neglect, and
disinheritance that violate their children’s natural rights to support,
protection, and education from their parents. This argument about the natural
norms and laws of sex, marriage, and family life, was adumbrated by Aristotle,
elaborated by Thomas Aquinas, and then extended by scores of later
theologians, philosophers, and jurists. Many of the great architects of Western
liberalism embraced these traditional teachings and defended them with
arguments from nature, reason, custom, fairness, prudence, utility,
pragmatism, and common sense. Their arguments echoed loudly in sundry
Anglo-American common law texts, statutes, and cases until the twentieth
century, and they remain instructive even for our post-modern polities and
families.

* Director of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion; Alonzo L. McDonald Distinguished
Professor; and Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Emory University. I am deeply grateful to Elliott Foote,
Andy Mayo, and Justin Latterell for their excellent research assistance, Amy Wheeler for her expert
administrative help, and Elizabeth Christian and Kelly Parker Cobb for their fine library services.
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INTRODUCTION
For better or worse, we are in the midst of a family law revolution that is
upending millennium-long laws and customs of the West.1 A century ago,
American law defined marriage as an exclusive and enduring monogamous
union between a man and a woman with the freedom and capacity to marry
each other.2 Marriage was considered to be the heart of the family and
household, and it was designed for the mutual love and support of husband and
wife, their mutual protection from sexual temptation, and their mutual
procreation, nurture, and education of children. The law required that
engagements be formal and that marriages be contracted with parental consent
and witnesses and with a suitable waiting period, sometimes accompanied by
the publication of banns. It required marriage licenses and registration and
solemnization before civil authorities, religious authorities, or both. It
prohibited marriages between couples with various blood and kin ties
identified in the Mosaic and Roman law. It discouraged marriage where one
party was impotent or had a contagious disease that precluded sex and
procreation or physically endangered the other spouse. Couples who sought to
divorce had to publicize their intentions, to petition a court, to show adequate
cause or fault, and to make provision for the dependent spouse and children.
Criminal laws outlawed fornication, adultery, prostitution, sodomy, polygamy,
incest, contraception, abortion, and other perceived sexual offenses. Tort laws
held third parties liable for seduction, enticement, loss of consortium, or
alienation of the affections of one’s spouse. Many of these legal rules had
millennium-long roots in the civil law, canon law, and common law traditions
of the West, with several rules going deeper still into ancient Greek and
Roman laws.3
1 This Article is part and product of ongoing work on the history of law, religion, and family. It draws in
part from JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE
WESTERN TRADITION (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT]; JOHN WITTE, JR., GOD’S JOUST,
GOD’S JUSTICE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (2006) [hereinafter WITTE, GOD’S JOUST];
JOHN WITTE, JR., THE SINS OF THE FATHERS: THE LAW AND THEOLOGY OF ILLEGITIMACY RECONSIDERED
(2009) [hereinafter WITTE, SINS]; and JOHN WITTE, JR., WHY TWO IN ONE FLESH: THE WESTERN CASE FOR
MONOGAMY OVER POLYGAMY (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter, WITTE, POLYGAMY]. ©John Witte, Jr.
2 For the propositions of this paragraph, see the detailed sources in WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT, supra
note 1, at 287–324; WITTE, GOD’S JOUST, supra note 1, at 295–449. For a compilation of relevant American
statutes and cases, broken down by legal topic, see CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS. For an
overview of English common law developments, see A CENTURY OF FAMILY LAW, 1857–1957 (R.H. Graveson
& F.R. Crane eds., 1957). For authoritative summaries of prevailing American family law at the turn of the
twentieth century, see sources cited infra notes 575–80.
3 See sources in WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT, supra note 1, at 17–112; WITTE, SINS supra note 1, 11–104;
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD: MARRYING AND ITS DOCUMENTATION IN WESTERN CHRISTENDOM, 400–1600 (Philip
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Today, much of this traditional family law has fallen or been pushed aside
in favor of new cultural and constitutional norms of sexual liberty, privacy, and
autonomy.4 Marriage is viewed increasingly at law and at large today as a
private contract to be formed, maintained, and dissolved as the parties see fit.
Requirements of parental consent and witnesses to the formation of
engagement and marital contracts have largely disappeared. Mandatory waiting
periods between engagement and marriage have also largely disappeared.
Unilateral no-fault divorce statutes have reduced the divorce proceeding to an
expensive formality in most states. Payments of alimony and other forms of
post-marital support to dependent spouses and children have given way to
lump-sum property exchanges providing a clean break for parties to remarry.
Court-supervised property settlements between divorcing spouses have largely
given way to privately negotiated or mediated settlements often confirmed
with little scrutiny by courts. Many states now offer off-the-rack models of
straight and same-sex marriage, civil union, and domestic partnership with
shrinking functional distinctions between them. Privacy laws protect all
manner of other voluntary sexual conduct and relationships among adults, and
rapidly growing portions of the population are no longer bothering with formal
marriage, especially those with fewer means and less education. Free speech
laws protect all manner of sexual expression, short of obscenity and child
pornography. The classic sex crimes of incest, prostitution, and polygamy
remain on the books, but they are now the subjects of emerging cultural and
constitutional battles.5 The formal legal categories of marriage and family also

L. Reynolds & John Witte, Jr. eds., 2007). The best single volume overview remains JAMES A. BRUNDAGE,
LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE (1987).
4 For the propositions of this paragraph, see the detailed sources in WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT, supra
note 1, at 331–59; FAMILY TRANSFORMED: RELIGION, VALUES, AND SOCIETY IN AMERICAN LIFE (Steven M.
Tipton & John Witte, Jr. eds., 2005). For good overviews of current Anglo-American family law from
different perspectives, see ANN LAQUER ESTIN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (2013);
WHAT IS PARENTHOOD: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY (Linda C. McClain & Dan Cere eds.,
2013); AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(2002); RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006). For a series of excellent annual social science
studies of the changing patterns of marriage and family in the United States, see Marriage, INST. ON AM.
VALUES, http://www.americanvalues.org/marriage (last visited Feb. 7, 2015); Research and Analysis on
Health of Marriage and Family in America, NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, http://nationalmarriageproject.org
(last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
5 See, e.g., ANGELA CAMPBELL, SISTER WIVES, SURROGATES AND SEX WORKERS: OUTLAWS BY
CHOICE? (2013); Note, Inbred Obscurity: Improving Incest Laws in the Shadow of the “Sexual Family,”
119 HARV. L. REV. 2464 (2006). For further sources, see MARK GOLDFEDER, LEGALIZING PLURAL MARRIAGE:
THE NEXT FRONTIER IN FAMILY LAW (forthcoming 2015); WITTE, POLYGAMY, supra note 1.
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still remain on the books, but leading scholars are now pressing for their
“disestablishment,” if not outright “abolition.”6
These exponential changes in modern Anglo-American family laws have
been, in no small part, valiant efforts to bring greater freedom and equality to
American public and private life and to purge the law of its many centuries of
patriarchy, paternalism, and plain prudishness. They are also basic legal
adaptations to the exponential changes that have occurred in the culture and
condition of modern families: the stunning advances in reproductive and
medical technology; the exposure to vastly different perceptions of sexuality,
kinship, and family structure born of globalization; the growing relaxation and
diversification of norms and habits of sexual expression now greatly enhanced
by the internet and other media; the explosion of international and domestic
norms of human rights and freedom; and the implosion of the Ozzie and
Harriet family born of new economic and professional demands on wives,
husbands, and children, and much more.7
But all these changes in the culture and law of the family have introduced a
number of striking new separations in the sexual field—separations between
marriage and sex, between marriage and childbirth, between marriage and
child rearing, between childbirth and parenting, between sex and physical
contact (with the advent of the virtual world), and between childbirth, sexual
intercourse, and biological filiation (with the introduction of IVF technology,
surrogacy, and sperm banks).8 Historically, the Western legal tradition
promoted the integration of marriage, sexual intercourse, childbirth, and child
rearing within a sturdy family framework to best satisfy the natural rights and
needs of men, women, and children alike.9 Not so much now. As Chief Rabbi
Jonathan Sacks of the United Kingdom has written, the world of sex has
become “a value-free zone.”10

6 See the collection of perspectives in ELIZABETH BRAKE, MINIMIZING MARRIAGE: MARRIAGE,
MORALITY, AND THE LAW (2012); MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS (Anita Bernstein
ed., 2006); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER
THE LAW (2008); and Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236
(2010).
7 See sources cited supra note 3; see also DON S. BROWNING, MARRIAGE AND MODERNIZATION: HOW
GLOBALIZATION THREATENS MARRIAGE AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2003).
8 DON S. BROWNING, Family Law and Christian Jurisprudence, in CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 163, 165–68 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2008). See more fully BROWNING,
supra note 7, at 1–29, 211–44.
9 See WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT, supra note 1, 53–287; see also BROWNING, supra note 7, at 55–128.
10 JONATHAN SACKS, THE HOME WE BUILD TOGETHER: RECREATING SOCIETY 210 (2007).
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Whatever happens between two consenting adults in private is, most
people now believe, entirely a matter for them. The law may not
intervene; neither may social sanction. It is simply not other people’s
business.
Together with a whole series of other changes, the result has
been that what marriage brought together has now split apart. There
has been a divorce between sex and love, love and marriage,
marriage and reproduction, reproduction and education and nurture.
Sex is for pleasure. Love is a feeling, not a commitment. Marriage is
now deeply unfashionable. Nurture has been outsourced to
specialized child carers. Education is the responsibility of the state.
And the consequences of failure are delegated to social workers.11

It is no surprise to hear a distinguished rabbi—or a distinguished bishop,
imam, or priest—lament some of the excesses of the modern sexual revolution,
though there are plenty of religious leaders who champion these modern
reforms.12 It is also no surprise to hear conservative scholars, judges,
commentators, and policy makers note with alarm the formidable
psychological, social, and economic costs of the modern sexual revolution.
Indeed, these critics have converted their energies into a new “marriage
movement” in America over the past two decades, seeking to counter some of
the perceived excesses and dangers of the modern sexual revolution.13
It will come as more of a surprise, at least for some readers,14 to hear strong
historical liberals issue stern warnings about the dangers of many of the very
family law reforms that America and other Western lands have been making.
But strong warnings are just what we hear in the writings of a long series of
11

Id.
See, e.g., GENE ROBINSON, GOD BELIEVES IN LOVE: STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT GAY MARRIAGE (2012).
13 The Institute for American Values and the National Marriage Project are current leaders of this
movement. See supra note 4. The late Don Browning at the University of Chicago led a major series of
ground-breaking projects on “Religion, Culture, and Family” in the 1990s and early 2000s, which he compiled
into a summary volume. See DON S. BROWNING ET AL., FROM CULTURE WARS TO COMMON GROUND:
RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY DEBATE (2d ed. 2000).
14 It was a surprise to me at least and forced me to correct the too narrow and too negative view of
Enlightenment theories of marriage in my first edition of FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE,
RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (1997), where I presented John Stuart Mill as the
representative voice of Enlightenment liberalism. Id. at 200–02. On fuller and deeper reading since then, I now
realize that Mill’s teachings on sex, marriage, and family are, in fact, a rather liberal anomaly of liberalism
before the twentieth century. I regret this mischaracterization and offer this Article as a partial corrective to my
youthful ignorance. For better analysis of the development of liberal thought on the family from the
seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, see BRENT WATERS, THE FAMILY IN CHRISTIAN SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT (2007); and SCOTT YENOR, FAMILY POLITICS: THE IDEA OF MARRIAGE IN MODERN
POLITICAL THOUGHT (2011).
12
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leading Enlightenment liberals in continental Europe, England, Scotland, and
America.15 For all of their antiestablishment and sometimes antireligious
crusades on so many fronts, these Enlightenment liberals supported the
traditional natural configuration of sex, marriage, and family life and the
traditional body of family laws that accompanied it. The honor roll of such
Enlightenment writers included Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, Jean
Barbeyrac, John Locke, Mary Wollstonecraft, Baron Montesquieu, François
Voltaire, David Hume, Henry Home, Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Jeremy
Bentham, William Blackstone, William Paley, Thomas Jefferson, Joseph
Story, James Kent, and scores of other philosophers and jurists writing from
roughly 1600 to 1900. Most of these figures were sharp critics of Christian
establishments and sometimes of Christian theology altogether—although a
number of them still identified themselves as Christians. Many of them were
free thinkers who regularly rattled and rankled the intellectual and legal status
quo. Many of them were major architects of modern liberalism, and its
signature teachings of personal liberty, human rights, social equality,
democratic government, constitutional order, and rule of law. Nonetheless,
almost all of these Enlightenment liberals embraced most of the traditional
forms and norms of sex, marriage, and family life. And they called for the
continued integration of marriage, sexual intercourse, childbirth, and child
rearing within the family as the best way to protect the personal liberty and
natural rights of men, women, and children and to cultivate the health, safety,
and welfare of the community. Rather than citing the Bible and theology,
however, or simply relying on earlier classical and Christian arguments to
support their theory and law of the family, these Enlightenment writers offered
a whole series of interesting arguments from human nature, natural law, natural
rights, and natural fairness as well as arguments from utility, economics,
comparative anthropology, evolutionary biology, and plain common sense.
Their basic argument was that exclusive and enduring monogamous
marriages are the best way to ensure paternal certainty and joint parental
investment in children who are born vulnerable and utterly dependent on their
15 I am using the term “Enlightenment liberal(ism)” rather conventionally to describe the series of
intellectual movements from the mid-sixteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century in continental Europe,
England, Scotland, and America that helped bring legal, political, and social transformation, in part on the
strength of new ideas of rationalism, contractualism, individualism, pluralism, and more. Among many
accounts, see for example, ERNST CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT (Fritz C.A. Koelln &
James P. Pettegrove trans., 1951); PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION (1966); ARTHUR
HERMAN, THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT: THE SCOTS’ INVENTION OF THE MODERN WORLD (2001); HENRY F.
MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1976).
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parents’ mutual care.16 Exclusive and enduring monogamous marriages,
furthermore, are the best way to ensure that men and women are treated with
equal dignity and respect, and that husbands and wives, and parents and
children, provide each other with mutual support, protection, and edification
throughout their lifetimes.17 The positive law of the state must not only support
such marriages, the argument continued; it must also outlaw polygamy,
fornication, adultery, and easy divorce that violate the other spouse’s natural
rights as well as desertion, abuse, neglect, and disinheritance that violate their
children’s natural rights to support, protection, and education.
This argument about the most natural and expedient configuration of
marriage and the family norms drew on complex and evolving ideas
concerning human infant dependency, parental bonding, paternal certainty and
investment, and the natural rights and duties of husband and wives, and parents
and children. But it started with three brute realities about human nature and
sexual reproduction that every family law system had to address: that human
adults crave sex a good deal of the time, that human children need help for a
very long time, and that human beings, unlike all other animals, are capable of
self-destructive and species-destructive sexual behavior that society needs
somehow to deter in the interests of private and public health, safety, and
welfare.
The basic outline of this argument about the natural configuration of
marriage and the family was sketched already half a millennium before the
Enlightenment by the brilliant Dominican friar, Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas’
argument, in turn, became a staple of the thought of neo-Thomist Dominican
scholars gathered at the University of Salamanca in Spain, notably Francisco
Vitoria who was a major source of inspiration and instruction for later
Enlightenment writers. Early Enlightenment figures, like Hugo Grotius and
John Locke, took these (neo-)Thomistic arguments about marriage and the
family as the starting point for their more expansive liberal theory of the family
that generations of later Enlightenment philosophers and jurists echoed and
elaborated. Their views, in turn, penetrated deeply into the Anglo-American
common laws of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, courtesy especially of
William Blackstone and Joseph Story, who were avid readers of the
Enlightenment philosophers. This Article tells that story and then returns in the
Conclusions to some of the implications of that story for our day.
16
17

See infra Part V.A (discussing Henry Home).
See WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT, supra note 1, at 279–81 (discussing John Locke).
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I. THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN CLASSICAL AND
CHRISTIAN THOUGHT
A. Background
It was a commonplace of the Western tradition to speak of the “nature” of
marriage and the family—its natural form and function, its natural goods and
goals, its natural rights and duties that attach to husband and wife, and parent
and child. The Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–321 B.C.E.), for example,
viewed monogamous marriage as the natural foundation of the polis.18 He
envisioned humans as political or communal animals who form states and
other associations “for the purpose of attaining some good.”19 “[E]very state is
composed of households,” Aristotle wrote famously in his Politics.20 Every
household, in turn, is composed of a “pairing of those who cannot exist without
one another. Male and female must unite for the reproduction of the species—
not from deliberate intention, but from the natural impulse . . . to leave behind
them something of the same nature as themselves.”21
Aristotle extended this view in his Ethics, now emphasizing the natural
inclinations and goods of dyadic marriage beyond its political and social
expediency:
The love between husband and wife is evidently a natural feeling, for
nature has made man even more of a pairing than a political animal in
so far as the family is an older and more fundamental thing than the
state, and the instinct to form communities is less widespread among
animals than the habit of procreation. Among the generality of
animals male and female come together for this sole purpose [of
procreation]. But human beings cohabit not only to get children but to
provide whatever is necessary to a fully lived life. From the outset the
partners perform distinct duties, the man having one set, the woman
another. So by pooling their individual contributions [into a common
stock] they help each other out. Accordingly there is general
agreement that conjugal affection combines the useful with the
pleasant. But it may also embody a moral ideal, when husband and
wife are virtuous persons. For man and woman have each their own
special excellence, and this may be a source of pleasure to both.
18 See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, at xi, 7 (Ernest Barker ed. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press
reprt. ed. 1972) (c. 384 B.C.E).
19 Id. at 1.
20 Id. at 8.
21 Id. at 3.
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Children too, it is agreed, are a bond between the parents—which
explains why childless unions are more likely to be dissolved. The
children do not belong to one parent more than the other, and it is the
joint ownership of something valuable that keeps people from
separating.22

The Roman Stoics repeated and glossed these classical Greek views about
monogamous marriage, even while many of them celebrated celibacy as the
higher ideal for philosophers seeking quiet contemplation. For example,
Musonius Rufus (born c. 30 C.E.) described marriage in robust companionate
terms that prefigured the familiar language of the Western marriage liturgy:
The husband and wife . . . should come together for the purpose of
making a life in common and of procreating children, and
furthermore of regarding all things in common between them, and
nothing peculiar or private to one or the other, not even their own
bodies. The birth of a human being which results from such a union is
to be sure something marvelous, but it is not yet enough for the
relation of husband and wife, inasmuch as quite apart from marriage
it could result from any other sexual union, just as in the case of
animals. But in marriage there must be above all perfect
companionship and mutual love of husband and wife, both in health
and in sickness and under all conditions, since it was with desire for
this as well as for having children that both entered upon marriage.23

Musonius further insisted that sexual intercourse is “justified only when it
occurs in marriage and is indulged in for the purpose of begetting children.”24
He praised those lawgivers who “consider[] the increase of the homes of the
citizens [through procreation] the most fortunate thing for the cities and the
decrease of them [through infanticide] the most shameful thing.”25 Indeed, he
wrote, “whoever destroys human marriage destroys the home, the city, and the
whole human race.”26
The Roman law jurists reflected these views as well. Marriage was a
prominent public concern for Rome from the beginning, and marriage was
22 ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 225–26 (J.A.K. Thomson ed. & trans., Urwin Bros. Ltd. 1953)
(c. 350 B.C.E.). The interpolation “into a common stock” is an alternative translation that appears in several
other translations of this passage.
23 MUSONIUS RUFUS, WHAT IS THE CHIEF END OF MARRIAGE (c. 100), reprinted in CORA E. LUTZ,
MUSONIUS RUFUS: THE ROMAN SOCRATES 89, 89 (Cora E. Lutz trans., 1947).
24 Id. at 87.
25 Id. at 97.
26 Id. at 93; see also Roy B. Ward, Musonius and Paul on Marriage, 36 NEW TESTAMENT STUD. 281
(1990).
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considered “an honourable and desirable condition . . . that ensured the
continuation of the human race and provided a sort of communal immortality”
for Rome itself and for the extended families that made it up.27 A number of
Roman jurists had “a sentimental ideal” of marriage “focused on a standard of
companionate (but not necessarily equal) marriage and a delight in children as
individuals and as symbols of home comforts” and perpetuators of the family
name, property, and household.28 Unlike the philosophers who focused on the
functions and ethics of marriage, the Roman jurists focused on the form of
marriage and the formalities that attended its proper creation, maintenance, and
dissolution. They also focused on the critical relationships between parents and
children, especially surrounding family property and inheritance.29 All these
dense legal rules presupposed a basic natural law of the family. “The law of
nature is the law instilled by nature in all creatures,” Emperor Justinian put it in
summary. “It is not merely for mankind but for all creatures of the sky, earth
and sea. From it comes [the union] between male and female, which we call
marriage; also the bearing and bringing up of children.”30 In the mid-third
century, the Roman jurist Modestinus wrote that under the natural law a
“lawful marriage” is “the union of a man and a woman, a partnership for life
involving divine as well as human law.”31 His teacher Ulpian called marriage
an inseparable communion and a sacred and enduring union to be voluntarily
contracted for the sake of “marital affection” and the propagation of
offspring.32
The Western Christian tradition inherited and used these Graeco-Roman
teachings on the nature of marriage and family. To be sure, the marital
household was more than a natural institution for Christians; for them, it was
also a contractual, economic, social, and spiritual association, whether
27 JUDITH EVANS GRUBBS, LAW AND FAMILY IN LATE ANTIQUITY: THE EMPEROR CONSTANTINE’S
MARRIAGE LEGISLATION 64 (1995).
28 Suzanne Dixon, The Sentimental Ideal of the Roman Family, in MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND CHILDREN
IN ANCIENT ROME 99, 111 (Beryl Rawson ed., 1991); see also SUZANNE DIXON, THE ROMAN FAMILY (1992).
29 For a good illustration of rules and cases, see BRUCE W. FRIER & THOMAS A.J. MCGINN, A CASEBOOK
ON ROMAN FAMILY LAW (2004).
30 JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 36–37 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1987)
(c. 533) (rendering “conjugatio” as “intercourse” rather than “union”); see THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS 19
(W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1988) (c. 161) (“But the law which natural reason
makes for all mankind is applied in the same way everywhere. It is called ‘the law of all peoples’ because it is
common to every nation.”); see also id. at 13–26 (describing the various civil laws of marriage and family life
in Rome and their consonance with this law of nations).
31 2 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 657–58 (Theodor Mommsen & Paul Krueger eds., Alan Watson trans.,
Univ. of Pa. Press 1985) (c. 530).
32 Id. at 658, 707–10, 731–33; 3 id. at 182–200; JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, supra note 30, at 43.
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sacramental or covenantal.33 But, at its foundation, marriage and the family
was first and foremost a natural institution. Already in Paradise, Christians
argued, God had brought the first man and the first woman together as “two in
one flesh” and commanded them to “be fruitful and multiply.”34 God had
created them as social creatures, naturally inclined and attracted to each other.
God had given them the physical capacity to join together and to beget
children. God had commanded them to love, help, and nurture each other and
to inculcate in each other and in their children the love of God, neighbor, and
self. These duties and qualities of marriage, the Christian tradition taught,
continued after the fall into sin. After the fall, however, marriages also became
a remedy for lust, a balm to incontinence. Rather than allowing sinful persons
to burn with lust, God provided the remedy of marriage for parties to direct
their natural drives and passions to the service and love of the spouse, the
child, and the broader community.35
Like the Greeks and Romans, early Christian writers emphasized the public
and private goods of marriage and the family.36 The leading Western Church
Father, St. Augustine (354–430), called marriage a “holy and true fellowship”
and “friendship”37 and the marital household the “seedbed” of the city,38 the
“the first natural bond of human society.”39 He quoted his famous Greek
contemporary, St. John Chrysostom (345–407) about the political and social
utility of the family: “The love of husband and wife is the force that welds
society together. . . . Because when harmony prevails, the children are raised
well, the household is kept in order, and neighbors and relatives praise the
result. Great benefits, both for families and states, are thus produced.”40
Marriage also brought with it the goods of fidelity, children, and stability to the
couple and their children.41 As a contract of fidelity, marriage gave husband
and wife an equal power over the other’s body, an equal right to demand that
33
34
35
36

See WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT, supra note 1, at 2–4.
Genesis 1:27–28, 2:23–24; Matthew 19:5; 1 Corinthians 6:16; Ephesians 5:31 (Revised Standard).
See sources and discussion in WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT, supra note 1, at 31–75.
See overview in John Witte, Jr., The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019

(2001).
37

AUGUSTINE, ON THE GOOD OF MARRIAGE (c. 401), reprinted in 3 A SELECT LIBRARY OF THE NICENE
397, 403 (Philip Schaff ed., Peter Holmes et al. trans.,
reprt. ed. 1975).
38 AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS 667 (R.W. Dyson ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1998) (c. 426).
39 AUGUSTINE, supra note 37, at 399.
40 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, HOMILY 20 ON EPHESIANS 5:22–33 (c. 386), reprinted in ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM
ON MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE 43, 44 (Catharine Roth & David Anderson trans., 1986).
41 See id.
AND POST‑NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH
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the other spouse avoid adultery, and an equal claim to the “service, in a certain
measure, of sustaining each other’s weakness, for the avoidance of illicit
intercourse.”42 As a created, natural means of procreation, Christian marriage
rendered sexual intercourse licit, a proper means and manner of fulfilling
God’s command to “be fruitful and multiply.”43 As a kind of “sacramental
bond,” marriage was a source and symbol of permanent union and household
stability between Christians.44
Also like the Greeks and Romans, Christians taught that marriage is subject
to the laws of nature. For them, natural law was not only, as the Roman jurists
had put it, the law that “nature has taught to all animals,” which gave them
natural inclinations to protect, preserve, and perpetuate themselves through
procreation.45 Natural law was also what twelfth-century canonist Gratian
called the “natural instinct[s]” or “intuitions” that are unique to humans and the
“common” customs and conventions that have emerged among humans over
time.46 These distinctly human qualities of natural law, Christians taught, are
known through reason and conscience, and often confirmed, illustrated, and
sometimes enhanced by the Bible. Natural law, in this fuller human sense,
helped to channel fit persons’ natural drive and determination to marry when
they reach the age of puberty; to conceive children and nurture and educate
them until adulthood; and to remain bonded to their kin who are by nature
inclined to serve and support each other, especially in times of need, frailty,
and old age.47 The natural law prescribed heterosexual, lifelong unions
between a couple, featuring mutual support and faithfulness.48 It proscribed
incest, bestiality, buggery, sodomy, pederasty, masturbation, contraception,
abortion, and other unnatural and non-procreative sexual activities and
relations.49
42 AUGUSTINE, THE GOOD OF MARRIAGE (c. 401), reprinted in SAINT AUGUSTINE: TREATISES ON
MARRIAGE AND OTHER SUBJECTS 3, 16–17 (Roy J. Deferrari ed., Charles T. Wilcox et al. trans., 1955).
43 Id. at 10.
44 AUGUSTINE, ON MARRIAGE AND CONCUPISCENCE (c. 401), reprinted in 5 A SELECT LIBRARY OF THE
NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH, supra note 37, at 263, 268.
45 JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, supra note 30, at 45–47; THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 31, at 1; see
also GRATIAN, THE TREATISE ON LAWS (DECRETUM DD. 1–20) WITH THE ORDINARY GLOSS (c. 1472),
reprinted in 2 STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN CANON LAW 6–7 (Augustine Thompson & James
Gordley, trans., 1993) (providing translation).
46 GRATIAN, supra note 45, at 6–7.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See sample texts in RUDOLF WEIGAND, DIE NATURRECHTSLEHRE DUR LEGISTEN UND DEKRETISTEN
VON IRNERIUS BIS ACCURSIUS UND VON GRATIAN BIS JOHANNES TEUTONICUS [THE NATURAL LAW TEACHINGS
OF THE CIVILIANS AND DECRETISTS FROM IRNERIUS TO JOHN TEUTONICUS] 283–98 (1967). For additional
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B. Thomas Aquinas
Dominican friar, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), drew an important
distinction between the primary and secondary precepts of the natural law.50
Primary natural law precepts, he said, deal with activities that are primal,
inescapable; one cannot help but obey them.51 For example, each person must
eat, drink, and sleep to survive.52 Secondary natural law precepts guide
activities consistent with these primary precepts, but which “vary according to
the various conditions of persons, times, and other circumstances.”53 These
activities are not “binding in all cases, but only in the majority.”54 Primary
precepts command that everyone must eat, drink, and sleep, or they die.55
Secondary precepts help determine the appropriate amounts of food, drink, and
sleep for each person in different circumstances.56
The natural law of procreation is similar, Aquinas argued, but its secondary
precepts are more complex. Primary natural law precepts command that the
human race must procreate.57 If no one has children, the human race will die
out. Secondary natural law precepts, however, teach that not every person
needs to procreate.58 Some individuals are called to a life of chastity and
virginity.59 Others are called to marriage, and they produce children in
substitution for those who do not.60 In addition, secondary precepts teach that
some ways of procreating are more naturally just, healthy, and beneficial than
detailed sources, see BRUNDAGE, supra note 3; and PHILIP LYNDON REYNOLDS, MARRIAGE IN THE WESTERN
CHURCH: THE CHRISTIANIZATION OF MARRIAGE DURING THE PATRISTIC AND EARLY MEDIEVAL PERIODS
(1994).
50 5 THOMAS AQUINAS: SUMMA THEOLOGICA 2796–97 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province
trans., Thomas Moore Publ’g 1948) (c. 1274) [hereinafter AQUINAS, ST]; see also JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS:
MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 1 (1998). For later uses of these distinctions, building on Aquinas,
see FRANCISCO SUAREZ, DE LEGIBUS, AC DEO LEGISLATORE [A TREATISE ON LAWS AND GOD THE LAWGIVER]
(1612), reprinted in 2 SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUAREZ 3, 303–07 (Gwladys L.
Williams et al. trans., 1944); see also THOMAS SANCHEZ, DE SANCTO MATRIMONII SACRAMENTO
DISPUTATIONUN TOMI TRES [COMMENTARY ON THE HOLY SACRAMENT OF MARRIAGE IN THREE VOLUMES] bk.
7, fols. 265r–269v (Heredes, Martinii Nutii et Ioannem Meurisum 1617).
51 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2795–97.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 2798.
54 Id.
55 See PHILIP L. REYNOLDS, FOOD AND THE BODY: SOME PECULIAR QUESTIONS IN HIGH MEDIEVAL
THEOLOGY 4 (1999).
56 Id.
57 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2795–97.
58 See id. at 2798.
59 See id. at 2700 (explaining how perfection consists of a “contemplative life”).
60 Id. at 2699–700.
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others.61 After all, children can be produced by rape, fornication, prostitution,
concubinage, incest, polygamy, and monogamy alike.62 Secondary precepts,
moreover, teach that procreation means not just conceiving a child but
nurturing, educating, and preparing him or her for independent life.63 Animals
choose among these various methods of procreation and nurture by following
their natural instincts of attraction and revulsion.64 Humans follow these same
natural instincts, too, but they also use their reason and conscience to form
norms and habits of moral behavior in response.65 Those who attend properly
to the natural law understand that polygamy, incest, rape, fornication,
prostitution, and concubinage are inferior modes of procreation, for they cause
disproportionate harm to women and children.66 Exclusive and enduring
monogamous marriages accord better with the secondary precepts of natural
law.67
Aquinas elaborated on this argument in his Summa Contra Gentiles, a
sophisticated work of apologetics designed in part to present the teachings of
Christianity to Muslims, Jews, and other foreign “peoples” (gentiles) of the
day.68 Here he analyzed what he considered to be the deep natural construction
of all human marriages, not just Christian marriages, as ideally monogamous,
exclusive, and indissoluble unions.69
Aquinas built his account in part on the extensive observations of the
reproductive strategies of various animals just published by his teacher, Albert
the Great (c. 1193–1280).70 He also built on Aristotle’s teaching that humans
are marital animals before they are political animals, and that most men and
women have a natural attraction to each other and have a natural inclination to
produce “something of the same nature as themselves” as an act of
61

Id. at 2798.
See id. at 2766–816.
63 Id. at 2699–700.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 2795–96.
66 Id. at 2795–98.
67 Id.
68 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, bk. III, pt. II (Vernon J. Bourke trans., Univ. of
Notre Dame Press 1975) (c. 1260) [hereinafter AQUINAS, SCG]. I am grateful to the late Professor Don S.
Browning for alerting me to these texts. For his analysis of these materials, see BROWNING ET AL., supra note
13, at 113–24.
69 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 120–21, 142–52.
70 See, e.g., ALBERT THE GREAT, QUESTIONS CONCERNING ARISTOTLE’S ON ANIMALS 185–202, 225–65,
302–36, 439–72 (Irven M. Resnick & Kenneth F. Kitchell, Jr. trans., Catholic Univ. Press of Am. 2008)
(c. 1258). I am grateful to Professor Philip L. Reynolds for bringing this text to my attention.
62
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self-preservation and perpetuation.71 But Aquinas added several new insights
into the unique strategies of human reproduction through enduring pair
bonding, rather than through random or multiple sexual associations.
Aquinas first observed that humans are unique among other animals in
producing utterly fragile and helpless infants.72 Unlike other young animals,
human babies cannot soon run, fly, or swim away.73 They need nurture,
protection, food, shelter, and education for a number of years—ideally from
both their mother and father and their respective kin networks.74
[T]here are animals whose offspring are able to seek food
immediately after birth, or are sufficiently fed by their mother; and in
these there is no tie between male and female; whereas in those
whose offspring needs the support of both parents, although for a
short time, there is a certain tie, as may be seen in certain birds. In
man, however, since the child needs the parents’ care for a long time,
there is a very great tie between male and female, to which tie even
the generic nature inclines.75

“[A]mong some animals where the female is able to take care of the
upbringing of offspring, male and female do not remain together for any time
after the act of generation,” Aquinas continued.76 This is the case with cats,
dogs, cattle, and other herding animals, where newborns quickly become
independent after a brief nursing period.77 “But in the case of animals of which
the female is not able to provide for upbringing of children, the male and
female do stay together after the act of generation as long as is necessary for
the upbringing and instruction of the offspring.”78 In these latter cases, this
inclination to stay and help with the feeding, protection, and teaching of the
offspring is “naturally implanted in the male.”79 Birds are a good example:
they pair for the entire mating season and cooperate in building their nests; in
brooding their eggs; and in feeding, protecting, and teaching their fledglings
until they finally take flight on their own.80

71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

See supra text accompanying notes 18–22.
5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2699–700.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2700.
AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 144.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 144–45, 151.
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Human beings push this pair-bonding pattern of reproduction much further,
Aquinas continued, not only because their tiny children remain dependent for
so much longer but also because these children place heavy and shifting
demands on their parents as they slowly mature.81 Except in rare cases, this
requires the effort of both parents and the kin structures they each represent.82
[T]he female in the human species is not at all able to take care of the
upbringing of offspring by herself, since the needs of human life
demand many things which cannot be provided by one person alone.
Therefore it is appropriate to human nature to remain together with a
woman after the generative act, and not leave her immediately to
have such relations with another woman, as is the practice of
fornicators.83

For this reason, human males and females are naturally inclined to remain
together and to remain faithful to each other for the sake of their dependent
child(ren).
A man will remain with the mother and care for the child, however, only if
he is certain that he is the father, Aquinas continued.84 A woman will usually
know that a child is hers because she carries it to term and then nurses the child
thereafter.85 A man will know that a child is his only if he is sure that his wife
has been sexually faithful to him alone.86 Only with an exclusive monogamous
relationship can a man be sure that if his wife becomes pregnant that he is the
father.87 And only then will a man be likely to join his wife in care for their
child.88 “Man naturally desires to know his offspring,” Aquinas wrote; “and
this knowledge would be completely destroyed if there were several males for
one female. Therefore that one female is for one male is a consequence of a
natural instinct.”89
Aquinas recognized that paternal certainty alone was often not enough to
bind a man to his wife and child. He believed that human males, like other
81

Id. at 144–45.
Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 150–51.
85 Id.; see also 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2699 (“Now a child cannot be brought up and instructed
unless it have certain and definite parents, and this would not be the case unless there were a tie between the
man and a definite woman, and it is in this that matrimony consists.”).
86 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 150–51.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 151; 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2724–25 (explaining the marriage goods).
82
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male animals, craved sex with many females much more than they craved
permanent attachment to one woman.90 But a rational man, he insisted, can be
induced to care for his children and cleave to his wife because of his natural
instinct for self-preservation.91 Once a man realizes that a given child is
literally an extension of himself, a part and product of his own body and being,
“flesh of my flesh, bone of my bone,” he will care for the infant as he is
inclined to care for his own body.92 And once he begins this parental process,
his attachment to that child will settle and deepen, and he will remain with the
child and its mother.93 He will come to enjoy the interaction with and growth
of his child, and he will also enjoy the sexual intimacy and domestic support of
his wife as the family remains together.94
Both faithful and indissoluble marriage, Aquinas concluded, provides the
context for this parental-lifelong investment in children.95 Faithful and
exclusive marriage provides paternal certainty—ensuring a man that he is
investing in his own children, not those with whom he has no biological tie.96
Indissoluble and enduring marriage also provides parental investment—
ensuring children of the support of their parents for their many years of
maturation.97 These children will later reciprocate when their parents grow old
and fragile and enter into their own second childhood, becoming needy and
dependent anew.
To these two arguments from the nature of human reproduction and
parental attachment, Aquinas added a third argument from natural justice and
fairness to show that monogamy was superior to polygamy in humans—an
important issue for a work of apologetics that sought to appeal to Jews and
Muslims of his day, some of whom practiced polygamy.98 Aquinas rejected
polyandry (one female with multiple males) because it was naturally unjust to

90

AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 150–51; 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2724–25, 2795.
5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2725–26; see 3 id. at 1293–96 (describing a father’s love for his
child as “love for himself”).
92 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 147–48; see also Genesis 2:23.
93 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 147–48.
94 Id.; see also 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2725–26 (explaining how offspring are a “good” of
marriage).
95 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 147–50.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See details in WITTE, POLYGAMY, supra note 1 (assessing in chapter 1 the transition from polygamy to
monogamy in ancient Judaism, and in chapter 4 the medieval case for monogamy over polygamy).
91
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children.99 If a woman had sex with several husbands, he argued, it removed
the likelihood that the children born to that woman would clearly belong to any
one husband.100 This would undermine paternal certainty and consequent
paternal investment in their children’s care.101 The children would suffer from
neglect, and the wife would be overburdened trying to care for them and trying
to tend to her multiple husbands and their rampant sexual needs at once.102
Aquinas rejected polygyny (one male with multiple females) because it was
naturally unjust to wives.103 Polygyny did not necessarily erode paternal
certainty, Aquinas allowed.104 So long as his multiple wives were faithful to
him alone, a man could be assured of being the father of children born in his
household.105 But this required a man to pen up his wives like cattle, isolating
them from other roving males even when his own energies to tend to them
were already dissipated over the several women and children gathered in his
household.106 While locked up at home, the wives were reduced to servants,
and set in perennial competition with each other and with rival children for
resources and access to their shared husband.107 This is not marriage, “but,
instead, a sort of slavery,” said Aquinas.108 It betrayed the fundamental
requirements of fidelity and mutuality between husband and wife, the
undivided and undiluted love and friendship that become a proper marriage.109
True marital faith and “friendship consists in an equality” that should never be
divided, Aquinas wrote.110 It requires not only forgoing sexual intercourse with
another and honoring the reasonable sexual advances of one’s spouse.111 It also
requires the commitment to be indissolubly united with one’s spouse in body
and mind; to be willing to share fully and equally in the person, property,

99

AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 147–48, 151–52. See generally 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at
2794–97 (discussing whether it is within the natural law to have several wives).
100 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 147–48, 151–52.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 150–52; 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2794–801.
104 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2794–801.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 2794–98.
108 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 148, 152.
109 See id.
110 See id. at 152; 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2795–96.
111 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 152.
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lineage, and reputation—indeed, in the “entire life”—of one’s spouse.112 It is
to be and bear with each other in youth and in old age, in sickness and in
health, in prosperity and in adversity. Polygyny undercuts all of those
fundamental goods of marriage.
So, if it is not lawful for the wife to have several husbands, since this
is contrary to the certainty as to offspring, it would not be lawful, on
the other hand, for a man to have several wives, for the friendship of
husband and wife would not be free, but somewhat servile. And this
argument is corroborated by experience, for among husbands having
plural wives the wives have a status like that of servants.113

Natural law and natural justice thus teach monogamy.
Aquinas’ concern for natural justice and fairness to women and children
also framed his arguments against divorce and remarriage—which he regarded
as a form of “successive polygamy” or “digamy,” as the Christian tradition had
called it.114 His real concern was with “voluntary divorce”—unilateral, no-fault
divorce as we would call it today.115 This option was especially unjust to
wives, Aquinas said, for they would be left vulnerable to their husband’s
decisions to divorce them when they became barren or lost their youthful
beauty.116 If they had the right to divorce, many men, given their proclivity to
wander sexually, would not be encouraged to develop the comfortable habits
of monogamous fidelity to wife and child that the natural structure of
monogamy encourages.117 Many women would be discarded in middle age,
without support either from their husbands, who would likely go on to other
women, or from their fathers, who would likely be dead at that point. The
notion that a woman could have her own career to support herself, beyond that
of the cloister or church guild, was simply not within the medieval
imagination. This made divorce naturally wrong, said Aquinas: “So, if any
112 Id. at 147; 4 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2171–72; 5 id. at 2710–11 (calling matrimony a joining of
the bodies and minds of the husband and wife). See further texts and discussion in FINNIS, supra note 50, at
143–54.
113 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 152.
114 WITTE, POLYGAMY, supra note 1 (assessing in chapter 2 the arguments for monogamy versus
polygamy in the early church, and in chapter 4 the medieval case for monogamy over polygamy).
115 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2806–11; AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 147–50. St. Thomas
added an argument against divorce that rankles modern egalitarian sensibilities: “the female needs the male,
not merely for the sake of generation, as in the case of other animals, but also for the sake of government,
since the male is both more perfect in reasoning and stronger in powers.” AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at
147–48.
116 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 147–48.
117 Id. at 147–50.
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man took a woman in the time of her youth, when beauty and fecundity were
hers, and then sent her away after she had reached an advanced age, he would
damage that woman, contrary to natural equity” or natural justice.118
Removing divorce as an option for properly married couples not only
provided security for wives but also fostered “good behavior” in the marital
household, said Aquinas.119 The husband and wife will eventually be less
prone to adultery, knowing that they will have to live either alone or with their
spouse and that their adulterous lover will remain forever forbidden to them,
even after the death of their spouse.120 The marital couple will be more
inclined to fix “the sources of disagreements” so as to reach “a more solid
affection” for each other and their relatives, making life together more
agreeable.121 And they “will be more solicitous in their care for domestic
possessions when they keep in mind that they will remain continually in
possession of these same things.”122
Voluntary divorce was also naturally unjust to children, Aquinas continued,
for it squandered their inheritance and impeded their ability to take care of
their parents when those parents most needed help at the end of their lives.123
By the intention of nature, marriage is directed to the rearing of the
offspring, not merely for a time, but throughout its whole life. Hence
it is of natural law that parents should lay up for their children, and
that children should be their parents’ heirs. Therefore, since the
offspring is the common good of husband and wife, the dictate of the
natural law requires the latter to live together for ever inseparably:
and so the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law.124

This combination of natural arguments for monogamy and against
polygamy in various forms would become a staple for the Western legal
tradition. The core of the argument was focused on the natural needs and
tendencies of men, women, and children, and the premium placed on stable
monogamous marriage as the proper site for sexual exchange, mutual adult
dependency, and the procreation and nurture of long dependent children. The

118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id. at 147–48.
Id. at 149.
BRUNDAGE, supra note 3, at 39–40, 172.
AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 149–50.
Id.
5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2806–07.
Id. (citing 2 Corinthians 12:14).

WITTE GALLEYSPROOFS2

612

2/19/2015 12:28 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:591

core of the natural justice argument was focused on the injustice and harm
done to women and children by the multiplication or replacement of spouses.
To these natural arguments Aquinas and others added deep and complex
theological arguments about the sacramental nature of marriage that helped to
stabilize and solidify these intra-family relations and responsibilities.125 This
strengthened his case for the exclusive and indissoluble monogamous
marriages of Christians. But even stripped of its theological overlay and left to
stand alone, Aquinas’ arguments from nature were powerful. They were also
enduring. Many later jurists and philosophers—Catholics, Protestants, and
Enlightenment liberals alike—built on these early arguments to defend faithful
monogamous marriages.126 And today, a number of anthropologists and
evolutionary scientists have shown that enduring pair-bonding is the most
expedient means for human reproduction, given the realities of long and
demanding human infant dependency and the perennial sex drives of humans.
Indeed, human reproduction by enduring pair-bonding is described by modern
evolutionary scientists like Bernard Chapais as the “deep structure” of survival
that the human species has evolved.127 In his own premodern way, Aquinas
saw this already 750 years ago. Yes, he called it the human nature that God has
created, rather than a reproductive survival strategy that the human species has
evolved. But the conclusion was the same: exclusive and enduring marriages
and families are the best means of human reproduction and social flourishing.
Aquinas’ insights into the natural foundations of marriage and the family
were not only prescient of modern scientific teachings. They also helped form
the foundation for an emerging medieval law of natural rights for children and
their parents.128 The rights of the parents to marriage and procreation were
125

Id. at 2699–706. See the new detailed study of PHILIP L. REYNOLDS, HOW MARRIAGE BECAME ONE OF
SACRAMENTS: THE SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY OF MARRIAGE FROM ITS MEDIEVAL ORIGINS TO THE
COUNCIL OF TRENT (forthcoming).
126 See WITTE, POLYGAMY, supra note 1 (assessing in chapters 5–9 polygamous experiments in early
Protestantism, the Calvinist case against polygamy, the English case against polygamy, the early modern
liberal case for polygamy, and the enlightenment case against polygamy).
127 BERNARD CHAPAIS, PRIMEVAL KINSHIP: HOW PAIR-BONDING GAVE BIRTH TO HUMAN SOCIETY 10
(2008); see also PETER B. GRAY & KERMYT G. ANDERSON, FATHERHOOD: EVOLUTION AND HUMAN PATERNAL
BEHAVIOR 21–22 (2010); MELVIN A. KONNER, THE EVOLUTION OF CHILDHOOD: RELATIONSHIPS, EMOTIONS,
MIND 325–28 (2010). However, the topic remains controversial. See, e.g., HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOR:
A DARWINIAN PERSPECTIVE (Laura L. Betzig et al. eds., 1988); MIND THE GAP: TRACING THE ORIGINS OF
HUMAN UNIVERSALS (Peter M. Kappeler & Joan B. Silk eds., 2010).
128 On medieval rights talk, see BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL
RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW, AND CHURCH LAW, 1150–1625 (1997), and R.H. Helmholz, Human Rights in the
Canon Law, in CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 99 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S.
Alexander eds., 2010).
THE

WITTE GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

2/19/2015 12:28 PM

THE NATURE OF FAMILY, THE FAMILY OF NATURE

613

based on their natural duties “to be fruitful and multiply” by licit conjunctions
of “two in one flesh.”129 Their rights of parentage were further based on the
child’s natural duty to “[h]onor your father and mother”130 and the
community’s duty to “let the children come” to receive their love, support, and
nurture.131 The rights of children, in turn, were the correlatives of the duties
that parents owed to their children. As Jesus had put it in the Sermon on the
Mount,
[W]hat man of you, if his son asks him for bread, will give him a
stone? Or if he asks for a fish, will give him a serpent? If you then,
who are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how
much more will your Father in heaven give good things to those who
ask him! So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to
them; for this is the law and the prophets.132

It was biblical texts like these, together with the naturalist arguments of
Aquinas and others just outlined, that inspired medieval jurists to develop
especially the law of children’s rights.133 By the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, canon law and civil law texts alike spoke about a child’s right to life
and the means to sustain life; the right to care, protection, nurture, and
education; the later right to emancipation from the home and the right to
contract marriage, enter a profession, or join the clergy or monastery; and the
right to support and eventual inheritance from their natural or adoptive
parents.134 Furthermore, illegitimate children had special rights to oblation in a
129

Genesis 1:28, 2:24; Matthew 19:5; 1 Corinthians 6:16; Ephesians 5:31 (Revised Standard).
Exodus 20:12.
131 Matthew 19:14 (Revised Standard). These issues have received in-depth discussion. See Patrick
McKinley Brennan, Children Play with God: A Contemporary Thomistic Understanding of the Child, in THE
VOCATION OF THE CHILD 189 (Patrick McKinley Brennan ed., 2008); Anthony J. Kelley, Hope for Unbaptized
Infants: Holy Innocents After All?, in THE VOCATION OF THE CHILD, supra, at 215; Charles J. Reid, Jr., The
Rights of Children in Medieval Canon Law, in THE VOCATION OF THE CHILD, supra, at 245; Philip L.
Reynolds, Thomas Aquinas and the Paradigms of Childhood, in THE VOCATION OF THE CHILD, supra, at 154;
see also Judith M. Gundry, Children in the Gospel of Mark, with Special Attention to Jesus’ Blessing of the
Children (Mark 10:13-16) and the Purpose of Mark, in THE CHILD IN THE BIBLE 143, 148–49 (Marcia J. Bunge
et al. eds., 2008); Marianne Meye Thompson, Children in the Gospel of John, in THE CHILD IN THE BIBLE,
supra, at 195; Keith J. White, “He Placed a Little Child in the Midst”: Jesus, the Kingdom, and Children, in
THE CHILD IN THE BIBLE, supra, at 353, 364–65.
132 Matthew 7:9–12 (Revised Standard); see also 3 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 1293–96.
133 See detailed sources and discussion in CHARLES J. REID, JR., POWER OVER THE BODY, EQUALITY IN
THE FAMILY: RIGHTS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 92, 153–210 (2004); WITTE, SINS,
supra note 1, at 49–134; R.H. Helmholz, Children’s Rights and the Canon Law: Law and Practice in Later
Medieval England, 67 JURIST 39 (2007); R.H. Helmholz, And Were There Children’s Rights in Early Modern
England? The Canon Law and ‘Intra-family Violence’ in England, 1400–1640, 1 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 23
(1993); and Reid, Jr., supra note 131, at 243.
134 WITTE, SINS, supra note 1, at 49–134.
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monastery or legitimation by their natural or adoptive parents.135 Poor children
had special rights to relief and shelter.136 Abused children had special rights to
sanctuary and foster care.137 Abandoned or orphaned children had special
rights to foundling houses and orphanages.138 All these were real and
actionable “subjective” rights for children that medieval church courts and
state courts helped to enforce.139
C. Francisco Vitoria
In the sixteenth century, these Thomistic ideas about the natural law,
natural rights, and natural justice of sex, marriage, and family life were
expanded and systematized by a series of Spanish jurists, philosophers, and
theologians. Most of them, like Aquinas, were members of the Dominican
Order, and most of them were gathered at the University of Salamanca, one of
the great intellectual centers of early modern Spain.140 To illustrate, let us
focus on the work of one early titan of this Spanish school, Francisco de
Vitoria (c. 1492–1546). Vitoria is most famous today for his remarkable
defense of the rights of the American Indians against colonial authority.141 He
is also known for his treatises on the powers of church and state, on the power
of the papacy and of councils within the church, and on the international laws
of war and peace.142 In his own day, Vitoria was most famous for his lectures
and commentaries on the work of Thomas Aquinas. He commented on
Aquinas’ Summa Theologica as well as Aquinas’ commentaries on Peter
Lombard’s discussion of marriage in his Book of Sentences.143 Vitoria also
135

Id. at 98–99.
Id. at 98–103.
137 Id. at 126–27.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 122–34.
140 ANNABEL S. BRETT, LIBERTY, RIGHT, AND NATURE: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN LATER SCHOLASTIC
THOUGHT 1, 123 (1997); Rudolf Schüber, Moral Self-Ownership and Ius Possessionis in Late Scholastics, in
TRANSFORMATIONS IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY-MODERN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 149, 154–57 (Virpi Mäkinen &
Petter Korman eds., 2006); TIERNEY, supra note 128, at 207–315.
141 FRANCISCUS DE VICTORIA DE INDIS ET DE JURE BELLI RELECTIONES [REFLECTIONS ON THE INDIANS
AND THE LAW OF WAR BY FRANCISCO VITORIA] (Ernest Nys ed., Carnegie Inst. of Washington 1917) (1557)
[hereinafter VITORIA, REFLECTIONS].
142 Id.
143 FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, COMENTARIOS A LA SECUNDA SECUNDAE DE SANTO TOMÁS [COMMENTARIES
ON PART II-II OF SAINT THOMAS] (Vicente Beltrán de Heredia ed., Salamanca 1935) (c. 1536) [hereinafter
VITORIA, COMMENTARIES]. These Commentaries are excerpted in FRANCISCO DE VITORIA POLITICAL
WRITINGS 341–51 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991) [hereinafter VITORIA, POLITICAL
WRITINGS]. Vitoria’s analysis on marriage is also reflected in FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, DE JUSTITIA ET
FORTITUDINE [ON JUSTICE AND STRENGTH] (Vicente Beltrán de Heredia ed., Salamanca 1935) (c. 1536), and
136
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lectured at length on marriage in his own courses, and some of his students’
lecture notes were published posthumously as a pithy Summa on Marriage,
which remained in print for two centuries after his death.144
In a number of these works, Vitoria elaborated a sophisticated natural law
theory, including a natural law of marriage and family life, building on the
insights of Aquinas, Aristotle, and various medieval canon lawyers. Natural
law, he wrote, is both what is reasonable and what is commonly accepted.145
Nature and custom—the law of nature (ius naturale) and the laws of nations
(ius gentium)—often coincide.146 Christians can thus look for confirmation of
the contents of the natural law not only in the pages of Scripture but also in the
practices of all peoples, even those who operate without Scripture.147 So, when
Vitoria was asked whether the law of nature gives parents the right to raise
their own children, he cited not only the familiar passages on parental authority
in the Bible but also various examples of this rule and practice in ancient and
modern sources and concluded that “no one could really hold the idea that a
father is not bound to bring up his children. The fact that everyone agrees is
evidence in itself” that such a practice is in accord with the natural law.148
Natural law can also be discerned simply by the way things most naturally and
commonly operate. “That is natural which in itself belongs to anything, as, for
instance, the capacity to laugh and to think is natural to man. . . . Similarly with
the natural law: it is that which is properly and of itself right.”149
A thought or practice is naturally right either because it is naturally
permissible or naturally necessary, said Vitoria.150 Christians know that God as
FRANCISCO SUAREZ, COMMENTARIORUM AC DISPUTATIONUM IN TERTIAM PARTEM DIVI THOMAE
[COMMENTARY AND DISPUTATION ON THE THIRD PART OF SAINT THOMAS] (Moguntia, Sumptibus Arnold
Mylii 1590). Many of Vitoria’s writings were compiled after his death, both from (partial) manuscripts that he
left and from student notes on his lectures.
144 FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, Relectio de Matrimonio [Reflections on Marriage], in RELECTIONES
THEOLOGICAE XII [THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS 12] (Louvain, Apud Iacobum Boyerium 1557). For a modern
Spanish–Latin version, see 1 RELECCIONES TEOLÓGICAS DEL MAESTRO FRAY FRANCISCO DE VITORIA
[THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS OF THE PROFESSOR BROTHER FRANCISCO DE VITORIA] 420–52 (Luis G. Alonso
Getino ed., Imprenta La Rafa 1934) (1557) [hereinafter THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS], and 2 id. 439–504. For
further discussion, see GERHARD OTTE, DAS PRIVATRECHT BEI FRANCISCO DE VITORIA [THE PRIVATE LAW IN
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA] 23–40, 121–32 (1964).
145 VITORIA, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 143, at xiv–xv, 169–72.
146 See id. at 281.
147 BERNICE HAMILTON, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY SPAIN 12 (1963).
148 Id. (quoting Vitoria’s Commentaries on St. Thomas in DE JUSTITIA, supra note 143).
149 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Vitoria’s Commentaries on St. Thomas in DE JUSTITIA, supra note
143); see also texts in VITORIA, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 143, at 169–72.
150 HAMILTON, supra note 147, at 12.
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the creator of this natural law created things to operate by nature in a given
predictable way.151 Unless and until God changes the way things naturally are
(say, through a miracle or an act of force majeure), the patterns and behaviors
observed in nature are necessarily products and consequences of the natural
law.152
For instance, it is necessary for a man to breathe and have two eyes
and two feet and for the sun to rise tomorrow; but God could arrange
things differently . . . . Natural law, therefore, is said to be necessary
because nature cannot reverse the state of things without a divine
mandate.153

So it is without the natural law of marriage and the family, said Vitoria.154
“[W]ithout a divine mandate reversing the whole order of nature, the Ten
Commandments cannot be other than they are, that is, we ought to worship
God, honor our parents,” not commit adultery, and not covet our neighbor’s
wife or household.155 God can change these natural laws, but humans are
naturally bound to observe them unless and until God changes them.156
In his Summa on Marriage, Vitoria focused on the natural law of marriage
and family life.157 He offered a crisp recitation of Aquinas’ arguments about
the natural configuration of marriage and then expounded on the natural rights
of spouses, parents, and children.158 God, Vitoria wrote, created marriage as an
“indissoluble and exclusive” union between a fit man and a fit woman who are
capable of marriage to each other and not impeded by sundry blood or family
ties.159 Once these “two have become one flesh in accordance with the law of
God,” Vitoria wrote, only “God can rent them asunder” because only God can
change the natural laws of marriage that bind the united couple.160 God created
marriage with two main ends, Vitoria wrote.161 The “first and most important
end is the procreation and education of children” and preparation for them to

151

Id. at 12–13.
Id.
153 Id. (quoting Vitoria’s Commentaries on St. Thomas in DE JUSTITIA, supra note 143).
154 Id. at 13 (quoting Vitoria’s Commentaries on St. Thomas in DE JUSTITIA, supra note 143).
155 Id. (quoting Vitoria’s Commentaries on St. Thomas in DE JUSTITIA, supra note 143).
156 Id.
157 2 THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS, supra note 144, at 442–63. I am grateful to my former student Chris
Boussard for preparing a preliminary translation of this Spanish text.
158 Id. at 442–45.
159 Id. at 442–59.
160 Id. at 445–49.
161 Id. at 442–45.
152
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live a natural, rational, and virtuous life.162 “The second end of marriage is the
mutual fidelity and service of husband and wife to each other.”163 These two
ends of marriage are interrelated, said Vitoria, and they are tied to the “natural
design” of marriage as an exclusive and indissoluble union of a husband and
wife joined together in “one-flesh.”164 “Man is an infirm animal,” and if his
sinful nature were not constrained by natural laws, “all men would want to
mate with all women.”165 Such lawless behavior would quickly put men in a
perennial and violent sexual competition with each other and with all
women.166 Men would be having sex even with their mothers, sisters, and
relatives, and raping and ravishing women at will.167 Women who could not
defend themselves would be reduced to prostitutes or at best concubines.168
And children born of such “hot frenzy” would suffer miserably.169 “Uncertain
of their offspring,” men would not invest in care for any child or its mother,
especially when other sexual outlets were freely at hand.170 Exhausted by
sexual predation, pregnancy, and then the needs of their infants, “women
would not have the strength” to provide fully for their child without the father
present; no other family members would be at hand to fill in, since such a
natural kin network would not be known.171
Because of these proclivities, the natural law induces men and women to
marry unless they are naturally gifted with continence; to support and be
faithful to each other in all things including in their sex lives; and to work
together to nurture, protect, and educate their children until they are mature.172
Faithful and exclusive marriage is “a natural necessity” given our human
nature, Vitoria wrote.173 Operating under the same natural law, Christians and
non-Christians alike have thus developed marriage as the mandated institution
for responsible sex and child rearing.174 And they have learned, often by hard
and cruel experience, to outlaw fornication, adultery, prostitution, and

162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Id.
Id.
Id. at 445–49.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 442–59.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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concubinage—all of which come at the cost of paternal certainty and joint
investment in their children and with the consequences of harm, deprivation,
and sometimes death of these children.175 The Bible’s repeated injunctions
against sexual sin and for marital fidelity and parental care are simply echoes
of this natural law shared by all civilized peoples.176
These natural duties governing sex, marriage, and family life give rise to
natural rights within the family, Vitoria insisted, which can and should be
reflected in and guaranteed by the positive laws of church and state alike.177
First, each person has a “natural right” to enter into a marriage only of his or
her choice.178 No one can be coerced, tricked, or otherwise misled into a
marriage.179 And if they are, they must be given the unqualified right to seek
its annulment.180 No pope, prince, or parent can harm or impede this natural
right.181 “God only can compel” a couple to marry.182 We have examples of
that in the Bible: for example when God compelled Hosea to marry Gomer, the
prostitute (or, Vitoria could have added, when God told Joseph to marry Mary,
his betrothed, despite her seeming infidelity).183 But God generally gets
involved in marriages only by secretly moving the hearts of a man and woman
to cultivate true “mutual love and concordance of mind” for and with each
other.184 Second, husband and wife each have a “natural right” to support,
protection, and sex from the other—the “conjugal right” as St. Paul had called
it in 1 Corinthians 7, echoing Mosaic and natural law precedents.185 Given the
natural obligations each spouse has to remain bound to the other, each has the
natural right to have the most essential duties and qualities of their marriage
enforced. This includes not only sexual intercourse but physical, economic,
and social support and protection.186 Third, fathers and mothers both have a
“natural right” and a natural duty to raise, nurture, and educate their children
without interference by another, save in the event of abuse or abandonment of

175
176
177
178
179
180
181
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183
184
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See id.
See id. at 442–46.
See VITORIA, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 143, at 159–60.
See 2 THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS, supra note 144, at 442–49.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 449.
See id. at 447–49 (referencing the biblical stories in Hosea 1:2); see also Matthew 1:18–25.
See 2 THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS, supra note 144, at 449.
Id. at 442.
See id. at 442–49.
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the child.187 This natural right of parentage was so universal to humans that
even slaves and pagans should enjoy it, Vitoria argued in his tract on The
Rights of the Indians.188 And fourth, children have a natural right to be raised
and nurtured by their natural parents, those most inclined by nature to care for
them.189
Vitoria went on to argue that even the children of the purported “heathens”
of newly discovered colonial Latin America could not be coerced into baptism
or forced to receive Christian instruction contrary to their parents’ wishes.190
This was a contested issue in his day in Spain, as it had been during the
crusades and pogroms of the Middle Ages when some authorities condoned
forcible baptisms and removal of Jewish, Muslim, and pagan children from
their families to be raised in cloisters or Christian homes.191 Part of Vitoria’s
objection to such forced spiritual exercises echoed Aquinas’ reservation about
coercing false faith: “Since in the majority of cases, pagans cannot be coerced
without scandal or grave spiritual danger, St. Thomas replies quite simply that
they must not be coerced . . . . So it must be concluded that by natural law
infidels cannot be forced to accept the faith.”192 A further part of Vitoria’s
objection was that such practices violated the rights of the parents.193 “For the
children would be taken away from them: but those children have as yet no
rights of their own; they live by their parents’ rights, for the natural law gives
parents the power to direct their children’s lives.”194
Even if they are slaves in body infidels are not slaves in spiritual
matters, and so without the consent even of those who are slaves, it is
not lawful to ensure the salvation of their children. Otherwise it
would be lawful for the king even to baptize the children of free men,
for in the matter of religion one man is no more a slave than
another.195

Vitoria’s views would become a standard line of argument about the natural
law and natural rights of marriage and parentage—not only in Catholic circles
but also in later Protestant and Enlightenment circles.
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195

See id.
See VITORIA, REFLECTIONS, supra note 141, at 131.
See id.
See id. at 145.
See, e.g., VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS CONVERSION IN THE MIDDLE AGES (James Muldoon ed., 1997).
HAMILTON, supra note 147, at 114–16 (quoting from VITORIA, COMMENTARIES, supra note 143).
Id. at 117.
Id. (quoting from VITORIA, COMMENTARIES, supra note 143).
Id. (quoting from VITORIA, COMMENTARIES, supra note 143).
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II. HUGO GROTIUS AND THE EARLY MODERN NATURAL LAW ON SEX AND
MARRIAGE
An important conduit through which these (neo-)Thomist ideas of sex,
marriage, and family life poured into the broader Western legal tradition were
the writings of the eminent Dutch jurist and theologian Hugo Grotius (1583–
1645).196 Among legal historians, Grotius is prized as the father of
international law, famous for his pathbreaking writings on the laws of war and
peace and on the laws of prize and the sea, which became so critical to the
development of both public and private international law.197 Among church
historians, Grotius is infamous for defending his fellow Dutchman, Jacob
Arminius, against charges of “pelagianism,” an act that won him a prison
sentence for heresy.198 What is forgotten by some legal historians is that
Grotius was also an avid student of the neo-Thomist writings of the Spanish
school of Salamanca and that he drew (with ample attribution) many of his
cardinal legal ideas directly from Francisco Vitoria and others.199 Indeed, some
historians now call Vitoria, rather than Grotius, the father of international
law.200 What is forgotten by some church historians is that Grotius was a
distinguished Protestant theologian in his own right and not just an amateur
layman seduced by free-will liberals. Grotius wrote several commentaries on
the New Testament, a learned tract on church–state relations and ecclesiastical
law, several pamphlets of Christian devotion, and a richly textured work of
Christian apologetics.201 Drawing on diverse Catholic, Protestant, and classical
196

See JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE SPANISH ORIGINS

AND HIS LAW OF NATIONS (1934).
197 See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE

OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW: FRANCISCO

DE

VITORIA

BELLI AC PACIS [THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE] (Francis W. Kelsey et
al. trans., William S. Hein & Co. 1995) (1625) [hereinafter GROTIUS, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE]. For an
alternative translation, see HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (Richard Tuck ed., Jean
Barbeyrac trans., Liberty Fund 2005) (1625) [hereinafter GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE]. For
additional discussion of these and related topics, see HUGO GROTIUS, COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE
AND BOOTY (Martine Julia van Ittersum ed. & trans., Liberty Fund 2006) (1604), and HUGO GROTIUS, THE
FREE SEA (David Armitage ed., Richard Hakluyt trans., Liberty Fund 2004) (1609) [hereinafter GROTIUS, FREE
SEA].
198 See J.P. HEERING, HUGO GROTIUS AS APOLOGIST FOR THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION: A STUDY OF HIS
WORK DE VERITATE RELIGIONIS CHRISTIANAE (1640), at 6 (Robert J. Bast et al. eds., J.C. Grayson trans., 2004).
Pelagianism reflects the beliefs and teachings promoted by Pelagius and his followers, which stressed the
essential goodness of human nature, the freedom of the human will, and that denied the doctrine of original
sin.
199 See SCOTT, supra note 196, at 3.
200 Id. at 3, 160. For a good sampling, see generally ANTONIO TRUYOL SERRA, THE PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE WORK OF FRANCISCO DE VITORIA (1946).
201 See HUGO GROTIUS, DE IMPERIO SUMMARUM POTESTATUM CIRCA SACRA [ON THE RULE OF THE
SOVEREIGN IN RELIGIOUS MATTERS] (Harm-Jan Van Dam trans., Brill 2001) (1661); HUGO GROTIUS, DE
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sources, and using the tools of theology, jurisprudence, and natural philosophy
alike, Grotius set upon a lifelong quest for religious and political peace in
Europe, which in his day was being devastated by religious warfare.202
Crafting a common legal understanding of marriage was an important part
of this effort. “The union of the sexes, whereby the human species is
continued, is a subject well worthy of the highest legal consideration,” Grotius
wrote.203 For, as Aristotle taught us, marriage is the seedbed of the republic;
the first natural association; and the first school of morality, virtue, and good
citizenship.204 To get this institution right was essential to creating coherent
national communities, which needed internal stability before they could work
toward any kind of international legal harmony. Grotius also regarded marriage
as a “natural right” of all men and women, echoing Vitoria’s view.205 Even
slaves and captives should be granted this right, Grotius insisted contrary to
civil law precedents, given that marriage is “[t]he most natural Association”
known to mankind.206 He regarded celibacy as an option for those few with
unique abilities or disabilities but thought it “repugnant to the nature of most
men” and women.207
Both in his legal and theological writings, Grotius showed full command of
and respect for biblical norms and conventional Christian principles of
marriage. He adverted repeatedly to the axial biblical texts of Genesis 1 and 2,
Matthew 19, 1 Corinthians 7, and Ephesians 5, some of which he further

VERITATE RELIGIONIS CHRISTIANA [ON THE TRUTH OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION] (Oxford, William Hall
1662); HUGO GROTIUS, EXPLICATIO TRIUM UTILISSIMORUM LOCURUM N. TESTAMENTI [EXPLANATION OF THE
THREE MOST USEFUL LOCI IN THE NEW TESTAMENT] (Amsterdam, Apud Joh. & Cornelium Blaeu 1640);
HUGO GROTIUS, OPERA OMNIA THEOLOGICA [COMPLETE THEOLOGICAL WORKS] (London, Mosem Pitt 1679).
For an alternative translation of ON THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY, see also HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE TRUTH OF
CHRISTIANITY (Spencer Madan trans., London, J. Dodsley 1782) [hereinafter GROTIUS, TRUTH].
202 Among many studies recently with ample bibliographies, see generally HEERING, supra note 198;
FLORIAN MÜHLEGGER, HUGO GROTIUS: EIN CHRISTLICHER HUMANIST IN POLITISCHER VERANTWORTUNG
[HUGO GROTIUS: A CHRISTIAN HUMANIST IN POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY] (2007). On his theory of marriage,
which is understudied, see HUBERT RINKENS, DIE EHE UND DIE AUFFASSUNG VON DER NATUR DES MENSCHEN
IM NATURRECHT BEI HUGO GROTIUS (1583–1648), SAMUEL PUFENDORF (1632–1694), UND CHRISTIAN
THOMASIUS (1655–1728) [MARRIAGE AND THE VIEW OF NATURE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE NATURAL LAW
AMONG HUGO GROTIUS (1583–1648), SAMUEL PUFENDORF (1632–1694), AND CHRISTIAN THOMASIUS (1655–
1728)] (1971).
203 GROTIUS, TRUTH, supra note 201, at 108.
204 See supra notes 18–22.
205 See 2 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 513–14.
206 See id.
207 GROTIUS, TRUTH, supra note 201, at 108–10; 2 GROTIUS, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197,
at 204.
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glossed in his New Testament commentaries.208 He pored over the Mosaic
laws of marriage and the Pauline household codes.209 He cited frequently to the
marital writings of Augustine, Aquinas, Vitoria, and hundreds of other
classical and Christian authorities.210 “Christianity [is] by far the most
excellent of all possible religious systems,” he wrote proudly, in no small part
because “Christians are commanded to preserve indissoluble the sacred
obligations of the marriage vow, by mutual concessions, and mutual
forbearance” of husband and wife, each “bear[ing] an equal part in all the
duties of the married state.”211
But to build his natural law framework, Grotius was more interested in
what the law of nature itself could teach us about sex, marriage, and family life
independent of biblical norms and divine revelation.212 That was in part the
challenge he set for himself by uttering his (in)famously impious hypothesis:
that natural law would exist even if “we should concede that which cannot be
conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the
affairs of men are of no concern to Him.”213 It was the further challenge he set
by his definition of natural law whose contents and commandments were to be
rationally self-evident:
The law of nature is a dictate of right reason, which points out
that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational
nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; and
that, in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined by
the author of nature, God.
The acts in regard to which such a dictate exists are, in
themselves, either obligatory or not permissible, and so it is
understood that necessarily they are enjoined or forbidden by God. In
this characteristic the law of nature differs not only from human law,
but also from volitional divine law . . . .214

208

See 2 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 508–22.
See id.
210 See id. For a full list of Grotius’s sources, see 2 GROTIUS, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197,
at 889–930.
211 GROTIUS, TRUTH, supra note 201, at 327–29; see 2 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra
note 197, at 508–15, 516–20 n.7 (providing a distillation of Grotius’s fuller theological views in the lengthy
notes in Jean Barbeyrac’s translation as well as repeated citations to Scripture and Christian authorities).
212 See 2 GROTIUS, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 13.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 38–39 (footnote omitted).
209
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When deliberated purely rationally, without the aid of the Bible or divine
authorities, Grotius concluded, natural law confirms a number of traditional
Christian teachings of sex, marriage, and family, but not all of them and not
altogether clearly. Grotius insisted that the Bible does not prescribe or
proscribe anything “which is not agreeable to natural Decorum.”215 But he
further insisted that the “Laws of [Christ] do not oblige us” to conduct that
goes well beyond “what the Law of Nature already require[s] of [us].”216 Those
who believe that Scripture and nature command exactly the same conduct are
fooling themselves, Grotius observed.217 They will be “strangely embarrassed”
when they try “to prove, that certain [t]hings which are forbid[den] by the
Gospel, as Concubinage, Divorce, [and] Polygamy, are likewise condemned by
the Law of Nature.”218 While “[r]eason itself informs us that it is more Decent
to refrain” from such deviations from faithful monogamous marriage, natural
law does not necessarily prohibit them outright; that usually requires religious
sanction and command.219
With these distinctions in mind, Grotius began to sort through what
features of traditional Christian marriage “Nature seem[s] to require” and what
features are required only according to the Gospel.220 He sometimes was
content simply to show the overlaps between Christian and “heathen” marital
practices, evidently thinking this was proof enough of the natural qualities of
these practices.221 “[T]he instances are numerous,” he wrote, “wherein
heathens are observed to have inculcated, severally, the very same principles
and duties, which are collectively enjoined by our [Christian] religion.”222 The
heathens, he explained, teach that “the intentional adulterer is guilty of the
actual sin of adultery; . . . that a man should be the husband of one wife; that
the marriage-covenant should be inviolable.”223
Grotius sometimes combined the common patterns of animals with the
common customs of advanced civilizations to demonstrate what he thought
was natural. For example, he condemned “[t]he promiscuous enjoyment of all
women in common,” which some ancient peoples practiced and which even
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223

See 1 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 195.
Id.
See id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 185–89, 195–97.
See 2 id. at 514–15.
See id.
GROTIUS, TRUTH, supra note 201, at 221–22.
Id.
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Plato had commended in his Republic.224 Such practices would reduce the state
to “one common brothel,” Grotius concluded.225 “[S]ome even of the brute
animals” observe natural law far better, for they “are seen to observe a sort of
conjugal obligation” at least in their production of offspring.226 “Far more just
and reasonable it is, therefore, that man, the most excellent and most
distinguished of all animals, should not be suffered to derive his origin from
casual and uncertain parents, to the total extinction of those mutual ties, the
filial and parental affections.”227 Observing the natural law, humans have thus
learned to ensure the certainty of the bond between parents and children by
tying procreation to enduring monogamous marriages so “that confusion of
offspring may not arise.”228 And because of the long period of human infantile
dependency, humans have further learned to treat monogamous marriage as a
“real friendship,” “a perpetual and indissoluble union,” “a full participation
and mutual conne[ct]ion both of soul and body.”229
The superior advantage of this institution, in respect to the proper
education of children, is a truth as obvious as undeniable. Monogamy
was even the established custom of some particular Pagan nations;
among the Germans, for example, and the Romans: and herein the
Christians also follow their example, on a principle of justice, in
repaying, on the part of the husband, the entire and undivided
affection of the wife; while, at the same time, the regulations of
domestic economy may be better preserved under one head and
mistress of the family; and all those dissentions avoided which a
diversity of mothers must create among the children.230

Genesis 1 and 2 further confirm this natural preference for monogamous
marriage, said Grotius, because “God gave to one Man one Woman only, it
sufficiently appears what is best” for the marriages of the human race.231
Grotius’s argument for monogamy, albeit cryptic, was a textbook
restatement of the natural configuration of marriage expounded by Aquinas

224 Id. at 109; see also PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (c. 380 B.C.E.), reprinted in THE REPUBLIC AND OTHER
WORKS 147–48 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1973) (espousing utility in the idea that the wives and children of
“the guardians” of society be “in common”).
225 GROTIUS, TRUTH, supra note 201, at 109.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 109–10.
228 See 2 GROTIUS, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 235.
229 GROTIUS, TRUTH, supra note 201, at 110–11.
230 Id. at 111.
231 2 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 520.
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and Vitoria.232 The gist of the argument, as he saw it, was that enduring and
exclusive monogamous marriages were essential to ensuring parental certainty
for their children.233 And parental certainty, particularly for the father, was
essential so that parents would bond with their children who are born helpless
and remain utterly dependent upon their parents for survival for many years.234
Later Enlightenment writers took this argument as the starting point for their
theories of marriage and the family. Commenting on Grotius, for example, the
prolific German and Swedish jurist and historian, Samuel von Pufendorf
(1632–1694), wrote that the reality of lengthy infant dependence gave humans
a strong natural inclination toward exclusive and enduring marriages and a
strong natural abhorrence to sex outside of marriage—even though “man is an
animal always ready for the deed of love.”235 If natural law had not channeled
this strong male sex drive toward marriage, and men were permitted to have
random sex like “a cow [] in heat,” they would do nothing to help the mothers
and children who need them.236 “[W]hat man would offer his support unless he
were sure he was the father” of her child?237 “[W]hat man would undertake the
care of any but his own offspring, whom it is not easy to pick out when such
free license prevails?”238 Sex only within monogamous marriage was a natural

232

See supra Part I.B–C.
See 2 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO [ON THE LAW OF
NATURE AND NATIONS IN EIGHT BOOKS] 840, 842–44 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., Oceana
Publ’ns Inc. reprt. ed. 1964) (1688) [hereinafter PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE]; see also id. at 839–909;
2 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS LIBRI DUO [ON ELEMENTARY
UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE IN TWO BOOKS] 37–38, 275–76 (William Abbott Oldfather trans., Oceana Publ’ns
Inc. reprt. ed. 1964) (1680) [hereinafter PUFENDORF, ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE]; SAMUEL PUFENDORF,
THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN, ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF NATURE 174–84 (Ian Hunter & David Saunders eds.,
Andrew Tooke trans., Liberty Fund 2003) (1673) [hereinafter PUFENDORF, WHOLE DUTY]. For further
discussion of Pufendorf’s analysis, see ERIK WOLF, GROSSE RECHTSDENKER DER DEUTSCHEN
GEISTESGESHICHTE [GREAT LEGAL THINKERS IN GERMAN RELIGIOUS HISTORY] 311–70 (4th ed. 1963). For the
popularization of Pufendorf’s views, as well as those of Grotius, see JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 61 (Petter Korkman ed., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund
2006) (1763). For a general overview of these ideas and perspectives, see LEONARD KRIEGER, THE POLITICS OF
DISCRETION: PUFENDORF AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF NATURAL LAW (1965). Pufendorf’s and Burlamaqui’s
works were often cited by the American founders and early nineteenth-century judges and jurists. See infra
notes 350–51, 520, 531 and accompanying text.
234 See PUFENDORF, WHOLE DUTY, supra note 233, at 179; see also BURLAMAQUI, supra note 233, at 61
(explaining infant dependency concern).
235 See 2 PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE, supra note 233, at 845; see also BURLAMAQUI, supra note 233,
at 61; PUFENDORF, WHOLE DUTY, supra note 233, at x–xii.
236 2 PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE, supra note 233, at 845.
237 Id.; see also PUFENDORF, ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE, supra note 233, at 37.
238 2 PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE, supra note 233, at 845.
233
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necessity for mankind and a natural duty for each man, Pufendorf concluded,
later crediting Grotius for this insight.239
While monogamy is the naturally preferred form of marriage and forum for
sex, Grotius continued, he could not say that polygamy was automatically
rendered void by the law of nature alone.240 After all, a number of animals,
from chickens and cattle to lions and wolves, are polygamous and fare quite
well. A number of successful biblical patriarchs and kings were polygamous,
and no Old Testament law explicitly forbade them.241 A number of advanced
civilizations like Muslims are polygamous, and they are strong.242 Grotius
thought that polygamy was a reprehensible exploitation of women and an
indulgence of a man’s “brutal appetite,”243 and he praised the institution of
monogamous marriage taught by Christianity.244 But he concluded that it takes
“the law of Christ” to condemn polygamy outright.245 While this argument
convinced Pufendorf and other writers like Christian Thomasius and Baron
Montesquieu in the next century,246 several eighteenth-century and
nineteenth-century writers marshaled a strong natural law case against
polygamy, as we shall see in a moment.
Grotius had less trouble condemning polyandry—one woman with multiple
husbands—as contrary to natural law.247 But he did so with a heavy-handed
patriarchal argument that went beyond even the patriarchal conventions of his
day. A marriage “contracted with a Woman, who already has a Husband, is
void by the Law of Nature, unless her first Husband has divorced her; for till
then his Property in her continues.”248 “[I]n its natural State,” Grotius
explained, a marriage “puts the Woman, as it were, under the immediate
Inspection and Guard of the Man: For we see, even among some Beasts, such a
Sort of Society exists between the Male and Female.”249 In human marriages,
too, “the Authority is not equal; the Husband is the Head of the Wife in all
239

See id. at 839–909; PUFENDORF, WHOLE DUTY, supra note 233, at 174–76.
See 2 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 514–26.
241 See id. at 514–15; GROTIUS, TRUTH, supra note 201, at 110.
242 See GROTIUS, TRUTH, supra note 201, at 321, 325, 328 (noting Muslim polygamy and their use of
martial power to spread their religion).
243 Id. at 328.
244 See id. (praising Christianity over Islam).
245 Id. at 110; see also 2 GROTIUS, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 235, 239.
246 See sources and discussion in WITTE, POLYGAMY, supra note 1 (assessing in chapter 9 the
enlightenment liberal case against polygamy).
247 See 2 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 526.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 514.
240
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conjugal and family Affairs; for the Wife becomes Part of the Husband’s
Family, and it is but reasonable, that the Husband should have the Rule and
Disposal of his own House.”250 The gist of this argument was that polygyny
was unnatural because the natural law gives a man exclusive dominion over his
wife’s person, property, and contracts—the common law doctrine of
“coverture” now cast in general natural law terms.251 This argument not only
contradicted Grotius’s starting premise that men and women have an equal and
natural right to marry but it also made little sense. Men by nature share
property and power all the time—else no civilization could ever emerge from
the state of nature. Moreover, bees, ants, and other animals sometimes operate
successfully with matriarchies: why should they count any less than a herd of
cattle in describing the contents of natural law, especially since the orderliness
of beehives served Grotius’s later arguments about the natural legal order.
Later Enlightenment writers, beginning with John Locke, as we will see in a
moment, rejected Grotius’s argument about polygyny, instead condemning this
practice with more egalitarian natural law rationales.252 They also rejected
Grotius’s further argument that the natural law permits fathers to sell, enslave,
or lease their children.253 For most later Enlightenment writers, these
arguments were just a thin natural law apologia for the traditional unlimited
power of the paterfamilias at Roman law that had since been limited by civil
law reforms.
Grotius was considerably more nuanced and convincing in his treatment of
what he called a “difficult, if not impossible” question: whether the natural law
outlaws incest—sex with or marriage to a party related by blood or family
ties.254 Biblical law and Roman law firmly outlawed incest, and both Catholics
and Protestants wrote endlessly on this topic in their discussions of the
impediments of consanguinity and affinity.255 There is a strong natural law
argument against incest, too, said Grotius which supports at least some of these
traditional legal prohibitions. It is the argument from natural revulsion.256 Even
“dumb animals,” who operate only instinctually and “naturally,” simply avoid

250

Id.
See id. On common law coverture, especially respecting control of property, see for example
MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA (1986); MARY LYNDON
SHANLEY, FEMINISM, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND, 1850–1895, at 103–30 (1989).
252 See infra Part III.
253 See 2 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 511–12.
254 2 GROTIUS, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 239.
255 See BRUNDAGE, supra note 3, at 14, 36, 63, 88.
256 See 2 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 530.
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sexual relations between parents and children, brothers and sisters—no matter
how desperate their urge to mate.257 They are by nature repelled by such sexual
connections.258 Among humans, reason translates this natural “aversion” to sex
with close relatives into stronger terms of moral abhorrence as well.259 Unless
they have “been corrupted by evil education,” or are simply crazy, most people
have an automatic and visceral “revulsion” against such close sexual unions,
Grotius wrote.260 They see them as “contrary to the law of nature”—not only
impure and immodest but an outright “crime” and corruption of their rational
nature.261 Moreover, such close relations confuse natural family roles.262 How
can a father marry his daughter, or a mother her son, when they already have a
complete, and lifelong relationship of parent and child? How can a child, who
must always remain subordinate to the parent, become that parent’s spouse, or
even her head, through marriage? Also, to allow parents and children and
brothers and sisters who daily share the same household to have sex together
will “pave the way to unchastity and adultery, if such loves could be cemented
in marriage.”263 Sex or marriage between close relatives is contrary to human
nature and contrary to the laws of nature that govern humans.264 This insight
anticipated an “inhibitory mechanism” that modern scientists call the revulsion
reflex against incest, which humans evidently share with other higher
primates.265
Most civilizations, Grotius showed, used similar logic to extend the
category of incest to ban sexual and marital relations with other near relatives
as well, even if “those prohibitions do not come from the pure law of nature”
alone.266 While brute animals couple with more distant relatives, rational
humans do not.267 The three layers of consanguinity and affinity set out in the
Mosaic law have parallels in many other legal cultures, both before and after
the time of Moses.268 Grotius adduced dozens of Jewish, Greek, Roman, and
257

See 2 GROTIUS, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 241.
See id.
259 See Frans B. M. de Waal & Amy S. Pollick, The Biology of Family Values: Reproductive Strategies of
Our Fellow Primates, in FAMILY TRANSFORMED, supra note 4, at 34, 45–46.
260 2 GROTIUS, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 241.
261 Id. at 240.
262 See de Waal & Pollick, supra note 259, at 45–47 (explaining how sibling roles discourage sexual
attraction).
263 2 GROTIUS, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 243.
264 See id. at 239–41.
265 See de Waal & Pollick, supra note 259, at 45–47.
266 See 2 GROTIUS, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 242.
267 See 2 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 529.
268 See id. at 529–31.
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Christian writers who condemned incest, even if they differed on exactly
where to draw the line between distant relatives.269 Incest prohibitions and
aversions are so commonplace among men, Grotius concluded that “there must
have been some Law that prohibited them” either “given by [God] . . . to all
Mankind” or “derived from an invincible Impression of the Light of
Nature.”270
Grotius’s natural law argument against incest became a standard among
Western jurists and moralists. Many of them cited natural repugnance and
inherent revulsion as the strongest indicators that incest of some sort was
against the natural law.271 Others added utilitarian arguments about bettering
the breed of mankind by mixing blood lines and about enlarging friendships in
the world by alliances formed by marriages between unrelated parties.272 Most
Enlightenment writers agreed with the English judge, Richard Cumberland
(1631–1718), who said that “all the Laws in Scripture against Incest are, not
[absolute], but in a degree and measure, greater or lesser, Laws of Nature, or
Branches of the Law of Nature . . . [for] doing otherwise is ordinarily in the
Nature of the Thing an Incongruity.”273 But most also agreed with influential
French philosopher, Baron Montesquieu (1689–1755), who wrote that, with
incest as with other marriage and family norms, “it is a thing extremely
delicate to fix exactly the point at which the laws of nature stop and where the
civil laws begin.”274 For the reality is that “[i]t has happened in all ages and
countries, that religion has been blended with marriages. When certain things
have been considered as impure or unlawful, and [have] nevertheless become
necessary, they were obliged to call in religion to legitimate in the one case,
and to reprove in others.”275 But in this day of contested religious claims,
Montesquieu continued, the critical question is whether there are alternative
norms and auxiliary expedients, besides religion, that can channel nature or

269 See id.; 2 GROTIUS, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 239–41; GROTIUS, FREE SEA, supra
note 197, at 105.
270 2 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 531–33.
271 See RICHARD CUMBERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF NATURE 854–55 (Jon Parkin ed., John
Maxwell trans., Liberty Fund 2005) (1671); WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY (Liberty Fund 2002) (1785); ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (1763), reprinted in
5 THE GLASGOW EDITION OF THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF ADAM SMITH 163–69 (R.L. Meek et al.
eds., photo. reprint 1982) (1978).
272 See SMITH, supra note 271, at 163–69.
273 CUMBERLAND, supra note 271, at 855.
274 2 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 69 (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Publ’g Co.
1949) (1748).
275 Id. at 67.
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school natural inclinations in the direction of exclusive and enduring
monogamous marriages between unrelated men and women with the fitness
and capacity to marry each other.276
Defining more clearly the point at which the natural laws of marriage and
family start and stop was one challenge Grotius left for later Enlightenment
writers. Defining more fully what else nature teaches about many other
features of traditional marriage and family not treated fully by Grotius was a
further challenge. A large number of Enlightenment writers took up these
challenges in developing a natural law of marriage, often as part of a broader
theory of natural law and the law of nations (ius gentium). Hundreds of
writings on point have survived from the seventeenth through nineteenth
centuries. Among English writers, the best and most original such reflections
on the nature of marriage and the family came from political philosopher John
Locke,277 the utilitarian philosopher William Paley,278 the early feminist
philosopher Mary Wollstonecraft,279 and the Cambridge jurist Thomas
Rutherforth.280 Among Germans, the most prolific natural law writer on
marriage was Samuel von Pufendorf281 (whose work together with that of
Grotius was popularized in Europe and America by the Genevan jurist Jean
Jacques Burlamaqui) as well as the German jurists Johannes Wolfgang
Textor282 and Christian Thomasius.283 Among Scottish Enlightenment figures,
the most influential writings were by Gershon Carmichael,284 David

276

See id. at 27–80 (working out his theory of law and religion and the disestablishment of religion).
See infra Part III.A.
278 See infra Part V.
279 See infra Part III.B.
280 See generally THOMAS RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 162–86, 386–95 (Baltimore,
William & Joseph Neal 2d ed. 1832, photo. reprint 2004) (1754) (assessing marriage and the effect of civil law
on marriage).
281 See supra notes 233–39.
282 See JOHANN WOLFGANG TEXTOR, SYNOPSIS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 13–25 (James Brown Scott ed.,
John Pawley Bate trans., Carnegie Inst. of Washington 1916) (1680). On Burlamaqui, see supra notes 233–39.
283 See CHRISTIAN THOMASIUS, INSTITUTES OF DIVINE JURISPRUDENCE WITH SELECTIONS FROM
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS (Thomas Ahert ed. & trans., Liberty Fund 2011) (1688,
1705, respectively).
284 See, e.g., NATURAL RIGHTS ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT: THE WRITINGS OF GERSHOM
CARMICHAEL 128–37 (James Moore & Michael Silverstone eds., Michael Silverstone trans., 2002).
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Fordyce,285 John Millar,286 Francis Hutcheson,287 Adam Smith,288 and Henry
Home.289 A solid intellectual history and analysis of all these early modern
Enlightenment writings on marriage and the family remains to be written: it
will be a large treatise if done comprehensively. Let’s just sample a few of
these writings to show the power, creativity, and comprehensiveness of these
arguments about the nature of marriage and the family, and then show how
they were woven into the Anglo-American common law of marriage in the
later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
III. JOHN LOCKE, MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, AND THE EMERGING LIBERAL
NATURAL LAW OF MARRIAGE
A. John Locke
In his famous Two Treatises of Government, John Locke (1632–1704),
pressed a natural law and natural rights argument for marriage and family life
that was cast in more liberal and egalitarian terms than that of Grotius.290
Locke, in fact, designed his theory of marriage to refute the patriarchal theories
of his fellow Englishman, Robert Filmer.291 In his Patriarcha (c. 1638), Filmer
argued that God had created the patriarchal domestic commonwealth, headed
by the paterfamilias, as the source of the hierarchical political commonwealth
headed by the king.292 God had created Adam and Eve as founders not only of
the first marriage and family but also of the first state and society.293 Adam
was the first husband but also the first ruler.294 Eve was the first wife but also
the first subject.295 Together with their children, they comprised at once a

285 See DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THREE BOOKS WITH A BRIEF
ACCOUNT OF THE NATURE, PROGRESS, AND ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHY 81–88 (Thomas Kennedy ed., Liberty
Fund 2003) (1754).
286 See JOHN MILLAR, THE ORIGIN OF THE DISTINCTION OF RANKS: OR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH GIVE RISE TO THE INFLUENCE AND AUTHORITY, IN THE DIFFERENT MEMBERS OF
SOCIETY 47–66, 109–39 (Aaron Garrett ed., Liberty Fund 2006) (1771).
287 See infra notes 436–44.
288 See SMITH, supra note 271, at 141–71.
289 See infra Part IV.A.
290 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 162–69 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
2d ed. 1967) (1689).
291 See PATRIARCHA AND OTHER POLITICAL WORKS OF SIR ROBERT FILMER (Peter Laslett ed., 1949).
292 See id. at 57–58.
293 See id.
294 See id.
295 See id.
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domestic and a political commonwealth.296 All persons thereafter were, by
birth, subject to the highest male head, descended from Adam.297
Locke responded to Filmer first by flatly denying any natural or necessary
connection between the political and domestic commonwealths, between the
authority of the paterfamilias and that of the magistrate.298 “[T]he Power of a
Magistrate over a Subject,” he wrote, “may be distinguished from that of a
Father over his Children, a Master over his Servant, a Husband over his Wife,
and a Lord over his Slave.”299 The “little Common-wealth” of the family is
“very far from” the great commonwealth in England “in its Constitution,
Power and End.”300 “[T]he Master of the Family has a very distinct and
differently limited Power, both as to time and extent, over those several
Persons that are in it; . . . he has no Legislative Power of Life and Death over
any of them, and none too but what a Mistress of a Family may have as well as
he.”301
Locke responded next by denying Filmer’s patriarchal interpretation of the
creation story in Genesis. God did not create Adam and Eve as ruler and
subject, but as husband and wife, said Locke.302 Adam and Eve were created
equal before God: “Male and female created he them.”303 Each had natural
rights to use the bounties of Paradise.304 Each had natural duties to each other
and to God.305 After the fall into sin, God expelled Adam and Eve from
Paradise.306 He increased man’s labor in his use of creation.307 He increased
woman’s labor in the bearing of children.308 He said to Eve: “thy desire shall
be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee.”309 These words, which Locke
noted Filmer had called “the Original Grant of Government” were “not spoken
to Adam, neither indeed was there any Grant in them made to Adam, but a
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See id.
See LOCKE, supra note 290, at 286.
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Id. at 341.
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See id. at 189–94.
Id.; see also Genesis 5:2 (King James).
LOCKE, supra note 290, at 189–94.
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Id. at 190.
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Id. at 189–94.
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Punishment laid upon Eve.”310 These words do not abrogate the natural
equality, rights, and duties with which God created Adam and Eve, and all
persons after them.311 They do not render all wives eternally subject to their
husbands.312 And they certainly do not, as Filmer insisted, give “a Father or a
Prince . . . an Absolute, Arbitrary, Unlimited and Unlimitable Power, over the
Lives, Liberties, and Estates of his Children and Subjects.”313
Men and women were born free and equal in the state of nature, Locke
argued.314 But “[God] having made Man such a Creature, that, in his own
Judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong
Obligations of Necessity, Convenience, and Inclination to drive him into
Society.”315 “The first Society” to be formed after the state of nature “was
between Man and Wife, which gave beginning to that between Parents and
Children.”316 This “Conjugal Society,” like every other society
is made by a voluntary Compact between Man and Woman: and tho’
it consist chiefly in such a Communion and Right in one anothers
Bodies, as is necessary to its chief End, Procreation; yet it draws with
it mutual Support, and Assistance, and Communion of Interest too, as
necessary not only to unite their Care, and Affection, but also
necessary to their common Off-spring, who have a Right to be
nourished and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for
themselves.317

Marriage has no necessary form or function beyond this “chief End” of
procreation, Locke argued against traditional understandings.318 Couples were
free to contract about the rest of the relationship as they deemed fit:
Conjugal Society, might be varied and regulated by that Contract,
which unites Man and Wife in that Society, as far as may consist with
Procreation and the bringing up of Children till they could shift for
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LOCKE, supra note 290, at 191.
Id. at 192–93.
312 Id. at 192.
313 Id. at 166.
314 Id. at 287, 339; see also JOHN LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE (W. von Leyden ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1954) (1676).
315 LOCKE, supra note 290, at 336.
316 Id. at 337.
317 Id.
318 See id.
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themselves; nothing being necessary to any Society, that is not
necessary to the ends for which it is made.319

Locke thus grounded marriage and the family in a set of natural rights and
duties. It was a natural right for a man and woman to enter into a marital
contract. It was a natural duty for them to render procreation an essential
condition of whatever marital contract they entered. It was a natural condition
of children to be born helpless and thus a natural right for them to be nurtured,
educated, and raised to maturity by the parents who conceived them. This
triggered the natural duty of their parents to remain together in marriage in
order to raise their children. Locke advanced an argument about the role of
long-term infant dependency in marriage formation that was strikingly similar
to one put forth by Thomas Aquinas:
For the end of conjunction between Male and Female, being not
barely Procreation, but the continuation of the Species, this
conjunction betwixt Male and Female ought to last, even after
Procreation, so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of
the young Ones, who are to be sustained by those that got them, till
they are able to shift and provide for themselves. . . . [W]hereby the
Father; who is bound to take care for those he hath begot, is under an
Obligation to continue in Conjugal Society with the same Woman
longer than other Creatures, whose Young being able to subsist of
themselves, before the time of Procreation returns again, the
Conjugal Bond dissolves of it self, and they are at liberty . . . .320

The logical end of Locke’s argument was that childless couples, or couples
whose children were of age and on their own, should be free to divorce, unless
they had found some other “Communion of Interest” to sustain their
marriage.321 Locke dithered on the question of divorce. It was not essential to
his argument to speak definitively on the subject, and he knew the dangers of
loose literary speculation on it given the heated English politics of his day. In
his private diary, he wrote quite brashly: “He that is already married may
marry another woman with his left hand. . . . The ties, duration, and conditions
of the left hand marriage shall be no other than what is expressed in the
contract of marriage between the parties’.”322 In his Two Treatises and other
319

Id. at 340.
Id. at 337–38.
321 See id. at 337.
322 Id. at 339 n.7 (alteration in original). The term “left-hand marriage” was a term of art in medieval and
early modern law to describe the so-called “morganatic relationship” between a nobleman and a common
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publications, however, he only flirted with the doctrine of divorce and
remarriage, suggesting delicately that the matter be left to private contractual
calculation.323
Another logical end of Locke’s argument was that polygamy was a
violation of the natural rights of wives and children and a violation of the
natural equality of husband and wife within the marital estate. Locke did not
say this clearly either, though the arguments for polygamy were pressing in his
day.324 He said obliquely that polygamy was not a proper “moral relation”
because it compromised a man’s “readiness to acknowledge and return
kindness received,” including presumably from his wife and children.325 He
suggested that polygamy, like other forms of promiscuity, was a “sin.”326 He
said more explicitly that a guarantee of liberty of conscience and religious
toleration did not prevent the state from punishing “the Dishonesty and
Debauchery of Mens lives”—which, for Locke, included “arbitrary Divorce,
Polygamy, Concubinage, simple Fornication,” adultery, and incest.327 These
sexual “immoralities,” said Locke, cannot “be exempt from the magistrate’s
power of punishing” them just because their proponents happen to call them
“articles of faith, or ways of worship.”328 Polygamy, like incest, adultery, and
the like are simply wrong, said Locke, and must be prohibited without
exception, religious liberty notwithstanding.329 This echoed Locke’s earlier
statement that polygamy and divorce are not so much matters of religion or
conscience but “things either of indifference or doubt”330 —the “adiaphora” or
unessentials of the faith. A magistrate may limit or prohibit these activities to
protect “the welfare and safety of his people” and to avoid the “greater

union, sometimes blessed by the church. The women were supported during the relationship and gained
truncated inheritance rights. Children born of these unions were considered legitimate, and received support
during their father’s lifetimes, but could not inherit from him. It’s not clear whether Locke is referring to this
kind of arrangement alongside a monogamous marriage.
323 See id.
324 For additional detailed sources, see WITTE, POLYGAMY, supra note 1 (assessing in chapter 9 Locke’s
natural rights arguments against polygamy).
325 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1689), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF
JOHN LOCKE: IN TEN VOLUMES 1, 96–97 (London, C. Baldwin 1823).
326 See LOCKE, supra note 314, at 171.
327 JOHN LOCKE, A THIRD LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1692), excerpted in JOHN LOCKE: A
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 69, 84 (Mark Goldie ed., 2010) (emphasis omitted).
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION (1667), reprinted in JOHN LOCKE: A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra note 327, at 105, 110–11.
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inconveniences than advantages to the community” that these activities
occasion.331
[A] toleration of men in all that which they pretend out of conscience
they cannot submit to, will wholly take away all the civil laws and all
the magistrate’s power, and so there will be no law, nor government,
if you deny the magistrate’s authority in indifferent things, over
which it is acknowledged on all hands that he has jurisdiction.332

This was an early statement of an important argument about the proper and
necessary limits of religious freedom and human rights claims to practice
polygamy. This argument for such limitations would grow in the Western legal
tradition, especially in nineteenth-century America, to reject the claims of
religious polygamists who claimed religious freedom exemptions from general
criminal laws prohibiting polygamy.333 Locke saw this religious freedom
argument for polygamy exemptions looming already in the later seventeenth
century, and he cut it off cleanly.
A final logical end of Locke’s argument was that church and state had little
role to play within marriage and the family. The church was a voluntary
assembly of like-minded believers who could enjoy only those powers that its
members had collectively delegated to it.334 No man has power over another’s
marriage, and thus the church had no delegated power over marriage that it can
ever exercise.335 The state likewise was a voluntary assembly, formed by a
governmental contract among like-minded parties who agreed to become
citizens.336 The state was formed after marriage and the family, and was
ultimately subordinate to it in priority and right.337 The private marriage
contract—that preceded any public government or private church contract—
sets the basic terms of the agreement between husband and wife, parent and
child, in accordance with the laws and rights of nature.338 The church could
intervene only at the invitation of the parties.339 The state could intervene only
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Id. at 111.
Id.
333 See sources and discussion in WITTE, POLYGAMY, supra note 1 (assessing in chapter 10 the American
case against polygamy). For a sixth-century Roman law exemption for Jewish polygamists, see id. (assessing
this issue in chapter 1).
334 See LOCKE, supra note 327, at 84.
335 See id.
336 See id.
337 See LOCKE, supra note 290, at 339–40.
338 See id.
339 See id.
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to enforce these contractual rights and duties, and only to vindicate the natural
rights and duties of each party within the household.340
For all the ends of Marriage being to be obtained under Politick
Government, as well as in the state of Nature, the Civil Magistrate
doth not abridge the Right, or Power of either naturally necessary to
those ends, viz. Procreation and mutual Support and Assistance whilst
they are together; but only decides any Controversie that may arise
between Man and Wife about them.341

Locke did not press this idea of private marital contracts to revolutionary
conclusions. He was a man of pious Puritan upbringing, and he held to
traditional biblical teachings throughout his life, even though he later shed
some of the more rigorous Anglo-Puritan conventions of his youth.342 His
famous Letters on Toleration and The Reasonableness of Christianity were
tracts of deep Christian conviction.343 In each of these writings, Locke called
on church and state to end their unhealthy alliances, to soften their belligerent
dogmatism, and to return to the simple moral truths of the Bible.344 In each of
these tracts, as well as in a series of glosses on the books of the New
Testament, he insisted on coating his doctrine of natural rights and duties with
a number of classic Christian teachings.345 These included the biblical
injunctions to heterosexuality, monogamy, procreation, nurture and education
of children, respect for the conjugal debt, and maintenance of healthy marital
sex lives.346 They also included biblical prohibitions on fornication, adultery,
lust, prostitution, polygamy, “causeless divorce,” and more.347 Like Grotius,
340

See id.
Id.
342 See JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF JOHN LOCKE’S
POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002).
343 JOHN LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY (1695), reprinted in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN
LOCKE IN NINE VOLUMES 1, 11–15, 140–43 (London, Rivington 12th ed. 1824) [hereinafter LOCKE, THE
REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY]; JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1690), reprinted in
JOHN LOCKE: A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra note 327, at 1; LOCKE, supra
note 327.
344 See JOHN LOCKE, A PARAPHRASE AND NOTES ON ST. PAUL’S FIRST EPISTLE TO THE
CORINTHIANS (1718), reprinted in 7 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE IN NINE VOLUMES, supra note 343, at 77,
118–23 [hereinafter LOCKE, FIRST EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS]; JOHN LOCKE, A PARAPHRASE AND NOTES
ON ST. PAUL’S EPISTLE TO THE EPHESIANS (1707), reprinted in id. at 429, 488–95 [hereinafter LOCKE, EPISTLE
TO THE EPHESIANS]; LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 343; LOCKE, supra note 314.
345 See LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 343, at 140; see also LOCKE, supra
note 314, at 109–21.
346 See LOCKE, FIRST EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS, supra note 344, at 118–23; LOCKE, EPISTLE TO THE
EPHESIANS, supra note 344, at 488–95.
347 See supra note 344; see also LOCKE, supra note 314, at 171.
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Locke thought ultimately that natural and biblical teachings on sex, marriage,
and family life largely converged, even though the Bible was more demanding.
“[H]e that shall collect all the moral rules of the philosophers, and compare
them with those contained in the New Testament,” he wrote, “will find them to
come short of the morality delivered by our Saviour, and taught by his
apostles” that the “law of morality Jesus Christ hath given us in the New
Testament . . . [is] a full and sufficient rule for our direction, and conformable
to that of reason.”348
Locke’s writings had a monumental impact on later Enlightenment
philosophers and jurists. In France, Baron Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, Marquis de Condorcet, François Voltaire, and many others cited and
quoted Locke’s writings with reverence, including notably his discussions of
marriage and the family.349 Montesquieu, in particular, echoed and elaborated
Locke’s marital theories at length in his Spirit of the Laws, an anchor text for
law, politics, and philosophy on both sides of the Atlantic for the next two
centuries.350 In America, John Adams, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and
many others took Locke’s marital and broader political theories as axiomatic,
and wove them (and Montesquieu’s elaboration of them) into their political
writings and into the family laws of the young American republic.351 And, in
England especially, Locke’s writings were the anchor text for a century of
brilliant advances in legal, political, and social philosophy, albeit with ever
greater focus on reason and nature instead of Scripture and tradition.352
Particularly influential was Locke’s image of the marital contract as the first
contract that humans formed as they proceeded from the state of nature in
order to form a society dedicated to the preservation of their natural rights and
liberties.
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LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 343, at 140–43.
See CASSIRER, supra note 15; GAY, supra note 15.
350 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 274, at 127–37; 2 id. at 83–93, 206–08, 213–20. On Montesquieu’s and
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B. Mary Wollstonecraft
To illustrate, let me just focus on one influential example, the work of early
feminist critic and educator Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797). In her famous
Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft pushed Locke’s premises
further in support of the natural rights of women within and beyond the
home.353 Notwithstanding Locke’s efforts, Wollstonecraft argued, traditional
patriarchal ideas continue to perpetuate the idea that “woman must be inferior
to man, and made for him.”354 It treats a woman as a mere pretty, demur, and
passive “toy of man,” to be shaken and rattled “whenever, dismissing reason,
he chooses to be amused,” though inevitably he will grow tired of this one toy,
especially when it becomes worn or damaged, and he will acquire another and
then another either at the same time or seriatim after divorce.355 It measures a
woman’s value and virtue in society merely by her physical beauty, by her
fecundity, by her capacity to bear and raise children.356 It says to a woman that
her main vocation in life is this: to “procreate and rot.”357
Wollstonecraft took sharp aim at the common law system of her day, which
still perpetuated traditional patriarchal forms where husbands ruled their wives
without check or restriction and confined them to procreation and menial
household duties. “The divine right of husbands, like the divine right of kings,
may, it is to be hoped, in this enlightened age, be contested without danger,”
she wrote.358 We cannot be seduced by “the same arguments that tyrannic[al]
kings and venal ministers have used, and fallaciously assert that woman ought
to be subjected because she has always been so.”359 Custom is not nature, and
the long habit of penning and domesticating women in a “gilt[ed] cage,” does
not make it right.360 Men have their “natural freedom,” rights, and dignity.361
Women do too. “It is time to effect a revolution in female manners—time to
restore to them their lost dignity—and make them, as a part of the human
species, labour by reforming themselves to reform the world.”362
353 See MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN (1792), reprinted in
OXFORD WORLD’S CLASSICS: A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN AND A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS
OF MEN 63 (Janet Todd ed., 2d reprt. ed. 2008).
354 Id. at 141.
355 Id. at 100.
356 See id. at 133.
357 Id.
358 Id. at 108.
359 Id. at 112.
360 Id.
361 Id. 112–13.
362 Id. at 113.
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The reform of the world that Wollstonecraft had in mind was for men and
women to be treated equally in private and public life and, given the education
and opportunity, to develop their minds and capacities to fit their native talents.
Men might be stronger in body on average, and women might have more
capacity and thus responsibility in the production and nursing of infant
children, Wollstonecraft allowed.363 And that might suggest different roles
within the public and private spheres for a time and different training to
prepare for the unique vocation of motherhood.364 “But I still insist, not only
the virtue, but the knowledge of the two sexes should be the same in nature,”
Wollstonecraft argued, “and that women, considered not only as moral, but
rational creatures, . . . [should] acquire human virtues . . . by the same means as
men, instead of being educated like a fanciful kind of half being.”365 She
added, “Liberty is the mother of virtue, and if women be, by their very
constitution, slaves, and not allowed to breathe the sharp invigorating air of
freedom, they must ever languish like exotics, and be reckoned beautiful flaws
in nature.”366
If a woman is given the freedom and education to develop her full capacity
of reason, virtue, and character, Wollstonecraft insisted, the marriage and
family life that she chooses to enter will be so much better.367 The marriage
will be a union of “equal moral beings,” a “dyadic perfectionist friendship”368
between partners who can sustain and support each other throughout a lifetime.
A properly educated woman will make a true friend and partner to her
husband, and not just a sexual plaything while they are newlyweds, a useful
mother as children grow up, but then a dispensable burden to her husband
when beauty, sex, and children are no longer the priority.369 She will also make
a much better mother, teacher, and role model for their children, preparing
them properly to rise to their full potential and contribution:
Contending for the rights of woman, my main argument is built
on this simple principle, that if she be not prepared by education to
become the companion of man, she will stop the progress of
knowledge and virtue; for truth must be common to all, or it will be
363

See id. at 106.
See id.
365 Id.
366 Id. at 103.
367 See id. at 106–07.
368 This phrase is from EILEEN HUNT BOTTING, WOLLSTONECRAFT, MILL AND WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS
(forthcoming 2016).
369 See WOLLSTONECRAFT, supra note 353, at 143–49.
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inefficacious with respect to its influence on general practice. And
how can woman be expected to co-operate unless she know why she
ought to be virtuous? unless freedom strengthen her reason till she
comprehend her duty, and see in what manner it is connected with
her real good? If children are to be educated to understand the true
principle of patriotism, their mother must be a patriot; and the love of
mankind, from which an orderly train of virtues spring, can only be
produced by considering the moral and civil interest of mankind; but
the education and situation of woman, at present, shuts her out from
such investigations.370

IV. HENRY HOME AND SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT TEACHINGS ON SEX,
MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY
A number of Scottish Enlightenment philosophers also endorsed Locke’s
views, but they also pushed beyond him in developing their natural law
theories of sex, marriage, and family life. They accepted Locke’s theories of
egalitarian monogamy and of the natural rights and duties within the household
between husband and wife, parent and child. But these Scottish writers worked
hard to show the deeper natural foundations of exclusive and enduring
monogamous marriages and the need for liberal societies to maintain most
traditional sex crimes.
A. Henry Home
The writings of Henry Home (1696–1782), known as Lord Kames of
Scotland, were particularly perceptive.371 A leading man of letters and a
leading justice of Scotland’s highest court, Home was a friend of Francis
Hutcheson, David Hume, Thomas Reid, Adam Smith, and other such Scottish
luminaries.372 He wrote extensively on law and politics, religion and morality,
history and economy, art and industry.373 He was best known for his brilliant
defense of natural law, principally on empirical and rational grounds.374 Home
sought to prove the realities of virtue, duty, justice, liberty, freedom, and other
natural moral principles, and the necessity for rational humans to create
370

Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
See HENRY HOME, ESSAYS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY AND NATURAL RELIGION 46–55, 66–95
(Mary Catherine Moran ed., Liberty Fund 2005) (1779).
372 For more information about the life and work of Home, see generally WILLIAM C. LEHMANN, HENRY
HOME, LORD KAMES, AND THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT: A STUDY IN NATIONAL CHARACTER AND IN THE
HISTORY OF IDEAS (1971); IAN SIMPSON ROSS, LORD KAMES AND THE SCOTLAND OF HIS DAY (1972).
373 See HOME, supra note 371.
374 See id. at 55–61.
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various offices, laws, and institutions to support and protect them.375 While his
rationalist methodology and naturalist theology rankled the orthodox Christian
theologians of his day, Home wanted to give his natural law argument a more
universal and enduring cogency. A devout and lifelong Protestant, he believed
in the truth of Scripture and the will of God.376 But he wanted to win over even
skeptics and atheists to his legal and moral arguments and to give enduring
“authority to promises and covenants” that helped create society and its
institutions.377
Among many other institutions and “covenants,” Home defended
monogamous marriage as a necessity of nature, and he denounced polygamy as
a “vice against [human] nature.”378 Home recognized, of course, that polygamy
was commonplace among some animals, drawing sundry examples from the
work of French Jesuit naturalist Buffon.379 He also recognized that polygamy
had been practiced in early Western history and was still known in some
Islamic and Asiatic cultures in his day.380 But, Home insisted, polygamy exists
only “where women are treated as inferior beings,” and where “men of wealth
transgress every rule of temperance” by buying their wives like slaves and by
adopting the “savage manners” of animals.381 Among horses, cattle, and other
grazing animals, he argued, polygamy is natural.382 One superior male breeds
with all females, and the mothers take care of their own young who grow
quickly independent.383 For these animals, monogamous “pairing would be of
no use: the female feeds herself and her young at the same instant; and nothing
is left for the male to do.”384 But other animals, such as nesting birds, “whose
young require the nursing care of both parents, are directed by nature to pair”
and to remain paired till their young “are sufficiently vigorous to provide for
themselves.”385
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See id.
See id. at 66–67.
377 See id. at 46.
378 See 1 HENRY HOME, SKETCHES OF THE HISTORY OF MAN: CONSIDERABLY ENLARGED BY THE LATEST
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS OF THE AUTHOR 204 (James A. Harris ed., Liberty Fund 2007) (1788)
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Humans are the latter sort of creature, said Home, for whom pairing and
parenting are indispensable.386 Humans are thus inclined by nature toward
enduring monogamous pairing of parents—indeed, more so than any other
creature given the long fragility and helplessness of their offspring.387 Home
expanded on the natural configuration of marriage and the importance of
human childhood dependency developed by Aquinas and Vitoria, and he added
new insights as well from the science of cultural development (anthropology as
we now call it):
Man is an animal of long life, and is proportionally slow in growing
to maturity: he is a helpless being before the age of fifteen or sixteen;
and there may be in a family ten or twelve children of different births,
before the eldest can shift for itself. Now in the original state of
hunting and fishing, which are laborious occupations, and not always
successful, a woman, suckling her infant, is not able to provide food
even for herself, far less for ten or twelve voracious children. . . .
[P]airing, is so necessary to the human race, that it must be natural
and instinctive. . . . Brute animals which do not pair, have grass and
other food in plenty, enabling the female to feed her young without
needing any assistance from the male. But where the young require
the nursing care of both parents, pairing is a law of nature.388

Not only is the pairing of male and female a law of nature, Home
continued, but “[m]atrimony is instituted by nature” to overcome humans’
greatest natural handicap to effective procreation and preservation as a
species—their perpetual desire for sex, especially among the young, at exactly
the time when they are most fertile.389 Unlike most animals, whose sexual
appetites are confined to short rutting seasons, Home wrote, humans have a
constant sexual appetite, which, by nature, “demands gratification, after short
intervals.”390 If men and women just had random sex with anyone—“like the
hart in rutting time”—the human race would devolve into a “savage state” of
nature and soon die out.391 Men would make perennial and “promiscuous use
of women” and not commit themselves to the care of these women or their
children.392 “[W]omen would in effect be common prostitutes.”393 Few women
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393

Id. at 263–64.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 268–69.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 265.
Id.

WITTE GALLEYSPROOFS2

644

2/19/2015 12:28 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:591

would have the ability on their own “to provide food for a family of children,”
and most would avoid having children or would abandon them if they did.394
Marriage is nature’s safeguard against such proclivities, said Home, and
“frequent enjoyment” of marital sex and intimacy “endears a pair to each
other,” making them want only each other all the more.395 “Sweet is the society
of a pair fitted for each other, in whom are collected the affections of husband,
wife, lover, friend, the tenderest affections of human nature.”396
The God of nature has [thus] enforced conjugal society, not only
by making it agreeable, but by the principle of chastity inherent in
our nature. To animals that have no instinct for pairing, chastity is
utterly unknown; and to them it would be useless. The mare, the cow,
the ewe, the she-goat, receive the male without ceremony, and admit
the first that comes in the way without distinction. Neither have tame
fowl any notion of chastity: they pair not; and the female gets no food
from the male, even during incubation. But chastity and mutual
fidelity are . . . . essential to the human race; enforced by the principle
of chastity, a branch of the moral sense. Chastity is essential even to
the continuation of the human race. As the carnal appetite is always
alive, the sexes would wallow in pleasure, and be soon rendered unfit
for procreation, were it not for the restraint of chastity.397

Polygamy violates this natural design and strategy for successful
procreation through enduring marital cohabitation, Home argued.398 First,
monogamy is better suited to the roughly equal numbers of men and women in
the world.399 “All men are by nature equal in rank: no man is privileged above
another to have a wife; and therefore polygamy is contradictory” to the natural
order and to the natural right of each fit adult to marry.400 Monogamous pairing
is most “clearly the voice of nature.”401 It is echoed in “sacred scripture” in its
injunction that two—not three or four—shall become “one flesh” in

394

Id. at 264–65.
Id. at 267.
396 Id.
397 Id. at 268–69. Later, Home condemned mandatory celibacy and abstinence within marriage as
“ridiculous self-denial,” an “impudent disregard of moral principles,” and the “grossest of all deviations, not
only from sound morality, but from pure religion” and natural law. See HOME, 3 SKETCHES, supra note 378, at
888–91.
398 See HOME, 1 SKETCHES, supra note 378, at 265–67.
399 Id. at 266.
400 Id.
401 Id.
395
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marriage.402 If God and nature had intended to condone polygamy, there would
be many more females than males.403
Second, monogamy “is much better calculated for continuing the race, than
the union of one man with many women.”404 One man cannot possibly provide
food, care, and nurture to the many children born of his many wives.405 Their
wives are not able to provide easily for their young when they are weakened
from child labor and birth, needed for nursing, or distracted by the many needs
of multiple children.406 Some of their children will be neglected, some will
grow up impoverished, malnourished, or undereducated, some will inevitably
die.407 “How much better chance for life have infants who are distributed more
equally in different families.”408
Third, monogamy is better suited for women.409 Men and women are by
nature equal, Home argued at length, building on the egalitarian themes of
Locke, among others.410 Monogamous marriage is naturally designed to
respect this natural gender equality, even while recognizing the different roles
that a husband and wife play in the procreation and nurture of their children.411
Thus marriage works best when a husband and wife have “reciprocal and
equal” affection as true “companion[s]” in life, who enjoy each other and their
children with “endear[ment]” and “constancy.”412 Polygamy, by contrast, is
simply a patriarchal fraud.413 Each wife is reduced to a servant, “a mere
instrument of pleasure and propagation” for her husband.414 Each wife is
reduced to competing for the attention and affection of her husband,
particularly if she has small children and needs help in their care.415 One wife
and her children will inevitably be singled out for special favor, denigrating the
others further and exacerbating the tensions within the household, which cause

402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415

Id.
Id.
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Id.
Id. at 267; 2 id. at 483–84.
1 id. at 266.
Id.
See id. at 261, 267–68, 287–311.
See id. at 287–89.
See id. at 287–311.
Id. at 267.
See id. at 266–67.
Id. at 267.
See id.
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the children to suffer, too.416 Packs of wolves might thrive this way, but
rational humans cannot.417 Combining natural instinct with rational reflection,
humans have discovered that monogamy is the “foundation for a matrimonial
covenant” between two equal adults.418
Fourth, monogamy is better designed to promote the fidelity and chastity
humans need to procreate effectively as a species.419 It induces husband and
wife to remain faithful to each other and to their children, come what may.420
Polygamy, by contrast, is simply a forum and a catalyst for adultery and lust.421
If a husband is allowed to satisfy his lust for a second woman whom he can
add as a wife, his “one act of incontinence” will lead “to others without
end.”422 Soon enough, he will lust after yet another wife and still another—
even the wife of another man, as the biblical story of King David’s lust for
Bathsheba tragically illustrates.423 The husband’s bed-hopping, in turn, will
“alienat[e] [the] affection[s]” of his first wife, who will embark on her own
bed-hopping.424 Such “unlawful love” will only trigger more and more rivalries
among husbands, wives, and lovers in which all will suffer.425 Moreover, by
sharing another man’s bed, the wife might well require her husband “to
maintain and educate children who are not his own.”426 This most men will not
do unless they are uncommonly smitten or charitable.427 Polygamy simply does
not work, Home concluded.428 “Matrimony between a single pair, for mutual
comfort, and for procreating children, implies the strictest mutual fidelity.”429
Even children understand that faithful monogamous marriage is “an
appointment of nature,” Home concluded.430 As infants they bond with both
their mothers and fathers and when they grow older they work to keep the
couple together.431 “If undisguised nature show[s] itself any where, it is in
416
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See id.
See id. at 267–68, 308.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 204, 270, 287–89.
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Id. at 287.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 288.
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Id. at 288–89.
Id.
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children,” Home wrote.432 “They often hear, it is true, people talking of
matrimony;” Home continued, “but they also hear of logical, metaphysical, and
commercial matters, without understanding a syllable. Whence then their
notion of marriage but from nature? Marriage is a compound idea, which no
instruction could bring within the comprehension of a child, did not nature
cooperate.”433 From the mouths of babes come profound truths about our most
basic institution.434 We hear in these words of Home the echoes of a children’s
right point of view that Locke had introduced and later theorists would expand:
the natural right of the child to be born in a society whose customs,
institutions, and laws protect their inclination, need, and right to be raised by
their parents of conception unless illness, accident, or death of a parent
intervenes.435
B. Francis Hutcheson and David Hume
Home’s argument for monogamy and against polygamy was typical of the
arguments from nature, reason, and experience that the Scottish Enlightenment
mustered in favor of traditional forms and norms of marriage. Some of these
writers supplemented these with arguments from Scripture and Christian
tradition, but most, like Home, sought to prove their case on rational and
empirical grounds so much as possible. For example, the great Scottish
philosopher of common sense, Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), who proved so
influential in America through the instruction of Princeton University President
John Witherspoon,436 grounded his argument for the natural law of monogamy,
fidelity, and exclusivity again on the natural needs of mothers and children:
Now as the mothers are quite insufficient alone for this necessary and
laborious task, which nature also has plainly enjoined on both the
parents by implanting in both that strong parental affection; both
parents are bound to concur in it, with joint labor, and united cares
for a great share of their lives: and this can never be tolerable to them
unless they are previously united in love and stable friendship: as
new children also must be coming into life, prolonging this joint
432

Id. at 265.
Id.
434 Id.
435 See id. at 265, 306 (discussing how animal pairings facilitate child rearing).
436 See, e.g., JOHN WITHERSPOON, LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY (Jack Scott ed., ann. ed., Univ. of
Del. Press 1982) (c. 1800–1801) (providing discussion largely derivative of Hutcheson’s lectures of the same
name); see also 7 THE WORKS OF THE REV. JOHN WITHERSPOON, LATE PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE AT
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY (H. Rondel Rumburg ed., Sprinkle Publ’ns 2001) (1802) (including similar lectures
on marriage).
433
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charge. To engage mankind more cheerfully in this laborious service
nature has implanted vehement affections between the sexes; excited
not so much by views of brutal pleasure[,] . . . as by some
appearances of virtues, displayed in their behavior, and even by their
very form and countenances. These strong impulses plainly sh[o]w it
to be the intention of nature that human offspring should be
propagated only by parents first united in stable friendship, and in a
firm covenant about perpetual cohabitation and joint care of their
common children. For all true friendship aims at perpetuity: there’s
no friendship in a bond only for a fixed term of years, or in one
depending upon certain events which the utmost fidelity of the parties
cannot ensure.437

“[N]ature has [thus] strongly recommended” that for humans all sex and
procreation occur within a “proper covenant about a friendly society for life,”
Hutcheson continued.438 “The chief articles in this covenant are” mutual
fidelity of husband and wife to each other.439 A wandering wife causes the
“greatest injury” to her husband by bringing adulterine children into the home
who dilute his property and distract him from “that tender affection which is
naturally due only to his own [children].”440 A wandering husband causes great
injury to his wife and children by allowing his affections and fortunes to be
squandered on prostitutes, mistresses, and lovers.441 Other articles of the
natural marital covenant, Hutcheson wrote, include “a perpetual union of
interests and pursuits” between husband and wife, a mutual commitment to
“the right education of their common children,” and a mutual agreement to
forgo separation and divorce.442 It is against reason and human nature,
Hutcheson wrote, “to divorce or separate from a faithful and affectionate
consort for any causes which include no moral turpitude; such as barrenness, or
infirmity of body; or any mournful accident which no mortal could prevent.”443
Divorce should be allowed only in cases of adultery, “obstinate desertion,

437 FRANCIS HUTCHESON, PHILOSOPHIAE MORALIS INSTITUTIO COMPENDIARIA
INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 218 (Luigi Turco ed., Liberty Fund 2007) (1747).
438 Id. at 220.
439 Id.
440 Id.
441 Id. at 220–21.
442 Id. at 221.
443 Id. at 221–22.
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capital enmity, or hatred and such gross outrages as take away all hopes of any
friendly society for the future or a safe and agreeable life together.”444
Similarly, the famous Scottish philosopher, David Hume (1711–1776), for
all his skepticism about traditional Christian morality, thought traditional legal
and moral norms of sex, marriage, and family life to be both natural and useful.
Hume summarized the natural configuration of marriage crisply: “The long
and helpless infancy requires the combination of parents for the subsistence of
their young; and that combination requires the virtue of chastity or fidelity to
the marriage bed.”445 Hume used many of the same arguments that Home had
mustered against polygamy. This “odious” institution denied the natural
equality of the sexes.446 It fostered “[t]he bad education of children.”447 It led
to “jealousy” and competition among wives, and more.448 Moreover, said
Hume, polygamy forced a man, distracted by his other wives and children, to
confine his other wives to the home—by physically threatening, binding, or
even laming them; by isolating them from society; or by keeping them so poor
and weak they could not leave.449 All this is a form of “Barbarism,” with
“frightful effects” that defy all nature and reason.450

444 Id. at 224; see also FRANCIS HUTCHESON, LOGIC, METAPHYSICS, AND THE NATURAL SOCIABILITY OF
MANKIND 206–07 (James Moore & Michael Silverthorne eds., Liberty Fund 2006) (1730) (on Hutcheson’s
more general theories of association and institutions).
445 DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 206–07 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1902) (1777); see also
DAVID HUME, ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY (Eugene F. Miller ed., Liberty Fund rev. ed. 1987)
(1777) [hereinafter HUME, ESSAYS].
446 HUME, ESSAYS, supra note 445, at 182, 185.
447 Id. at 185.
448 Id.
449 Id. at 186–87.
450 Id. at 185. Drawing on Hume, Adam Smith wrote similarly that

polygamy was on many accounts much inferior to monogamy of every sort. With regard to the
wives it produces the greatest misery, as jealousy of every sort, discord, and enmity must
inevitably attend it. The children also must be greatly neglected in every shape and lead but a
very wretched life. The servants must all be slaves and entirely under the power of their master.
With regard to the [polygamous] man himself, to whose happiness or rather pleasure the good of
all the rest seems to be sacrificed, he also has no great enjoyment. He is racked by the most
tormenting jealousy and has little enjoyment from the affections of his family or the intercourse
of other men. It is detrimental[] also to population, and besides it is very hurtful to the liberty of
the people.
SMITH, supra note 271, at 159. For additional details of Smith’s arguments, see generally id. at 150–73, 442–
49.
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Hume offered similar natural and utilitarian arguments against voluntary
divorce.451 Many in Hume’s day argued for divorce as a natural expression of
the freedom of contract and a natural compensation for having no recourse to
polygamy despite a man’s natural drive to multiple partners.452 “The heart of
man delights in liberty,” their argument went; “[t]he very image of constraint is
grievous to it.”453 Hume would have none of this. To be sure, he recognized
that divorce was sometimes the better of two evils—especially where one party
was guilty of adultery, severe cruelty, or malicious desertion, and especially
when no children were involved.454 But, outside of such narrow circumstances,
he said, “nature has made [] divorce” without real cause the “doom [of] all
mortals.”455
First, with voluntary divorce, the children suffer and become
“miserable.”456 Shuffled from home to home, consigned to the care of strangers
and stepparents “instead of the fond attention and concern of a parent,” the
inconveniences and encumbrances of their lives just multiply as the divorces of
their parents and stepparents multiply.457 Second, when voluntary divorce is
foreclosed, couples by nature become disinclined to wander and instead form
“a calm and sedate affection, conducted by reason and cemented by habit;
springing from long acquaintance and mutual obligations, without jealousies or
fears.”458 “We need not, therefore, be afraid of drawing the marriage-knot,
which chiefly subsists by friendship, the closest possible.”459 Third, “nothing is
more dangerous than to unite two persons so closely in all their interests and
concerns, as man and wife, without rendering the union entire and total.”460
“The least possibility of a separate interest must be the source of endless
quarrels and suspicions.”461 Nature, justice and prudence alike require their
continued consortium.462
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HUME, ESSAYS, supra note 445, at 187–90.
Id.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 187–90.
Id. at 188.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 189.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 187 (implying that voluntary divorces are not the norm).
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V. WILLIAM PALEY AND THE UTILITARIANS
The natural law writings of Cambridge philosopher, William Paley (1743–
1805) provide a good illustration of how these natural law arguments could be
pressed into a more utilitarian and natural rights direction.463 Paley was known
in his day as a “theological utilitarian[].”464 He sought to define those natural
principles and practices of social life that most conduce to human happiness—
in this life and in the next.465 Those principles and practices, he said, could be
variously sought in Scripture and tradition, divine law and natural law,
morality and casuistry—all of which, for Paley, contributed and came to “the
same thing; namely, that science which teaches men their duty and the reasons
of it.”466
Marriage is among the natural duties and rights of men and women, Paley
wrote, for it provides a variety of public and private goods.467 His list of
marital goods was a nice distillation of traditional arguments:
1. The private comfort of individuals, especially of the female
sex . . . .
2. The production of the greatest number of healthy children, their
better education, and the making of due provision for their settlement
in life.
3. The peace of human society, in cutting off a principal source of
contention, by assigning one [woman] to one man, and protecting his
exclusive right by sanctions of morality and law.
4. The better government of society, by distributing the community
into separate families, and appointing over each the authority of a
master of a family, which has more actual influence than all civil
authority put together.
5. The same end, in the additional security which the state receives
for the good behaviour of its citizens, from the solicitude they feel for
the welfare of their children, and from their being confined to
permanent habitations.
6. The encouragement of industry.468
463
464
465
466
467
468

PALEY, supra note 271, at 1–25.
See D.L. LEMAHIEU, THE MIND OF WILLIAM PALEY: A PHILOSOPHER AND HIS AGE 15 (1976).
See PALEY, supra note 271, at 1–25.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 167–68.
Id.
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Paley worked systematically through the respective “natural rights” and
“duties” of husband and wife, and parent and child.469 In marriage, a husband
promises “to love, comfort, honour, and keep, his wife,” and a wife promises
“to obey, serve, love, honour, and keep, her husband; in every variety of
health, fortune, and condition.”470 Both parties further stipulate “to forsake all
others, and to keep only unto one another, so long as they both shall live.”471 In
a word, said Paley, each spouse promises to do all that is necessary to “consult
and promote each other’s happiness.”472 These are not only Scriptural and
traditional duties of marriage. They are natural duties, as can be seen in the
marital contracts of all manner of cultures, which Paley adduced in ample
number.473 These natural duties, in turn, give the other spouse a natural right to
enforce them in cases of adultery, “desertion, neglect, prodigality,
drunkenness, peevishness, penuriousness, jealousy, or any levity of conduct
which administers occasion of jealousy.”474 What St. Paul called the mutual
“conjugal rights” of husband and wife are simply one way of formulating the
natural rights that husband and wives enjoy the world over.475
If the couple is blessed with children, the parents have a natural right and
“duty” to provide for the child’s “maintenance, education, and a reasonable
provision for the child’s happiness in respect of outward condition.”476 Parents’
rights to care for their children “result from their duties” to their children, said
Paley.477
If it be the duty of a parent to educate his children, to form them for a
life of usefulness and virtue, to provide for them situations needful
for their subsistence and suited to their circumstances, and to prepare
them for those situations; he has a right to such authority, and in
support of that authority to exercise such discipline as may be
necessary for these purposes. The law of nature acknowledges no
other foundation of a parent’s right over his children, besides his duty
towards them. (I speak now of such rights as may be enforced by

469
470
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Id. at 51, 193–216.
Id. at 194 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 194–96.
Id. at 196.
1 Corinthians 7:3–5 (Revised Standard).
See PALEY, supra note 271, at 199 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 210.
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coercion.) This relation confers no property in their persons, or
natural dominion over them, as is commonly supposed.478

But “[a] parent has, in no case, a right to destroy his child’s happiness,”
Paley went on, and those that do will suffer punishment, if not lose custody of
their child.479 Moreover, while parents have a right to encourage and train their
children to a given vocation and to give their consent to their children’s
marriages, “[p]arents have no right to urge their children upon marriages to
which they are averse.”480 Children, in turn, have a natural right to receive the
support, education, and care of their parents.481 They also have a natural duty
to love, honor, and obey their parents even when they become adults, and to
care for their parents when they become old, frail, and dependent.482
Paley worked systematically through the various traditional sex crimes that
deviated from these private and public goods of marriage, and the natural
rights and duties of the household—now marshaling natural, rational, and
utilitarian arguments against them.483 His arguments against incest, polygamy,
and polygyny differed little from those of the other natural law theorists whom
we have sampled. More original were his combinations of natural law and
utilitarian arguments against fornication, prostitution, adultery, and easy
divorce.
Paley opposed fornication—sex or cohabitation without marriage—mostly
because it “discourages marriage” and diminishes the private and public goods
it offers “by abating the chief temptation to it. The male part of the species will
not undertake the encumbrance, expense, and restraint of married life, if they
can gratify their passions at a cheaper price; and they will undertake anything
rather than not gratify them.”484 Paley recognized that he was appealing to
general utility, but he thought an absolute ban on fornication was the only way
to avoid the slippery slope to utter sexual libertinism.485 “The libertine may not
be conscious that these irregularities hinder his own marriage, . . . much less
does he perceive how his indulgences can hinder other men from marrying.”486
“[B]ut,” Paley explained, “what will he say would be the consequence, if the
478
479
480
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Id. at 213.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 212–16.
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same licentiousness were universal? [O]r what should hinder its becoming
universal, if it be innocent or allowable in him?”487
Fornication furthermore leads to prostitution, Paley went on, with its
accompanying degradation of women, erosion of morals, transmission of
disease, production of unwanted and uncared for children, and further
irregularities and pathos.488 Fornication also leads naturally to a tradition of
concubinage—the “kept mistress[],” who can be dismissed at the man’s
pleasure, or retained “in a state of humiliation and dependence inconsistent
with the rights which marriage would confer upon her” and her children.489 No
small wonder that the Bible condemned fornication, prostitution, concubinage,
and other such “cohabitation without marriage” in no uncertain terms, said
Paley, with ample demonstration.490 But, again, in these injunctions the Bible
is simply reflecting the natural order and moral sense of mankind:
Laying aside the injunctions of Scripture, the plain account of the
question seems to be this: It is immoral, because it is pernicious, that
men and women should cohabit, without undertaking certain
irrevocable obligations, and mutually conferring certain civil rights;
if, therefore, the law has annexed these rights and obligations to
certain forms, so that they cannot be secured or undertaken by any
other means, which is the case here (for, whatever the parties may
promise to each other, nothing but the marriage-ceremony can make
their promise irrevocable), it becomes in the same degree immoral,
that men and women should cohabit without the interposition of these
forms.491

Adultery is even worse than fornication, said Paley, because it not only
insults the goods of marriage in the abstract,492 it injures an actual marriage,
leaving the innocent spouse as well as their children as victims.493 For the
betrayed spouse, adultery is “a wound in his [or her] sensibility and affections,
the most painful and incurable that human nature knows.”494 For the children it
brings shame and unhappiness as the vice is inevitably detected and
discussed.495 For the adulterer or adulteress, it is a form of “perjury” that
487
488
489
490
491
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494
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Id. at 171–72 (emphasis omitted).
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Id. at 173.
Id. at 176–80.
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violates their marital vow and covenant.496 For all parties in the household,
adultery will often provoke retaliation and imitation—another slippery slope to
the erosion of marriage and the unleashing of sexual libertinism and
seduction.497 Both nature and Scripture thus rain down anathemas against it.498
Paley opposed frivolous or voluntary divorce as well, using arguments
from the “law of nature” and “general utility.”499 Like many other Protestants,
he thought that divorce and remarriage of the innocent spouse was both natural
and necessary in cases of adultery, malicious desertion, habitual intemperance,
cruelty, and serious crime—although he recognized that the “Scriptures seem
to have drawn the obligation tighter than the law of nature left it,” and that
separation from bed and board might be considered an option for some
Christians who wish to live strictly in accordance with the Bible.500 But Paley
was against voluntary divorces or separations for “inferior causes” or by
“mutual consent,” grounding his opposition in arguments from nature and
utility.501 Such “inferior,” or lighter, divorces were obviously against natural
law if the couple had dependent children, Paley thought.502
[I]t is manifestly inconsistent with the [natural] duty which the
parents owe to their children; which duty can never be so well
fulfilled as by their cohabitation and united care. It is also
incompatible with the right which the mother possesses, as well as
the father, to the gratitude of her children and the comfort of their
society; of both which she is almost necessarily deprived, by her
dismiss[al] from her husband’s family.503

Unilateral divorces for lighter causes, or for no cause at all, are not so
obviously against natural law for childless couples, Paley argued, but they are
still “[in]expedient” enough to prohibit.504 The worry is, again, the mixed
signaling of such a regime and the gradual slide down the slippery slope
toward “libertinism.”505 If such easy divorces are available, especially on a
unilateral basis, each spouse will be tempted to begin pursuing his or her own
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Id. at 177.
Id. at 177–78.
Id. at 178–80.
Id. at 186–87.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 189–90.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 186.
Id.
Id. at 189–91.
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separate interests rather than a common marital interest once the heat of their
new love has begun to cool.506 Each will begin hoarding their own money,
developing their own friendships, and living more and more independently
from the other.507 “This would beget peculation on one side, and mistrust on
the other; evils which at present very little disturb the confidence of married
life” but eventually will destroy it from within.508 The availability of easy
divorce will discourage spouses to reconcile their conflicts or “take pains to
give up what offends, and [practice] what may gratify the other.”509 They will
have less incentive to work hard to “make the best of their bargain” or
“promot[e] the pleasure of the other.”510
Limiting divorce to cases of serious fault will stop this inevitable
downward spiral in a marriage, Paley believed.511 Forcing couples to stay
together for better or worse, “though at first extorted by necessity, become in
time easy and mutual; and, though less endearing than assiduities which take
their rise from affection, generally procure to the married pair a repose and
satisfaction sufficient for their happiness.”512 The availability of easy divorce,
by contrast, will heighten the natural temptation of each spouse, especially the
husband, to succumb to “new objects of desire.”513 However much in love they
were with their wives on their wedding day, and however hard they try, men
are naturally inclined to wander after “the invitations of novelty” unless they
are permanently constrained to remain faithful to their wives even as their
wives lose their youthful vigor and figure.514 Thus
constituted as mankind are, and injured as the repudiated wife
generally must be, it is necessary to add a stability to the condition of
married women, more secure than the continuance of their husbands’
affection; and to supply to both sides, by a sense of duty and of
obligation, what satiety has impaired of passion and of personal
attachment. Upon the whole, the power of divorce is evidently and
greatly to the disadvantage of the woman: and the only question
appears to be, whether the real and permanent happiness of one half

506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514

Id. at 187–89.
Id. at 187–88.
Id.
Id. at 188.
Id.
Id. at 190–91.
Id. at 188.
Id.
Id.
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of the species should be surrendered to the caprice and
voluptuousness of the other?515

Paley’s natural law and theological utilitarian arguments in favor of
traditional understandings of sex, marriage, and family life would find
enduring provenance among many utilitarians into the nineteenth century. The
most famous of these utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), endorsed
most of these same propositions that Paley had set forth, even though Bentham
famously eschewed the natural law and natural rights language that had so
inspired Paley’s theory of marriage.516 Bentham thought most traditional sex,
marriage, and family norms could be rationalized on utilitarian principles
alone.517
VI. COMMON LAW FORMULATIONS OF THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE
Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, Home, Hutcheson, Hume, and Paley led scores
of other writers from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries who defended
traditional Western norms of sex, marriage, and family using this surfeit of
arguments from nature, reason, custom, fairness, prudence, utility, pragmatism,
and common sense. Some of these natural law theorists were inspired, no
doubt, by their personal Christian faith, others by a conservative desire to
maintain the status quo. But most of these writers pressed their principal
arguments on non-biblical grounds. And they were sometimes sharply critical
of the Bible—denouncing St. Paul’s preferences for celibacy, the Mosaic
provisions on unilateral male divorce, and the many tales of polygamy,
concubinage, and prostitution among the ancient biblical patriarchs and kings.
Moreover, most of these writers jettisoned many other features of the Western
tradition that, in their judgment, defied reason, fairness, and utility—including,
notably, the establishment of Christianity by law and the political privileging
of the church over other associations. Their natural law theory of the family

515

Id. at 189.
See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789),
reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 119–21, (John Bowring ed., London, Simpkin, Marshall &
Co. 1843); JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE (1802), reprinted in id. at 297, 348–57; JEREMY
BENTHAM, ANARCHICAL FALLACIES (c. 1796), reprinted in 2 id. at 489, 499, 531–32; JEREMY BENTHAM, A
MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (c. 1793–1795), reprinted in 3 id. at 31, 73; JEREMY BENTHAM, A GENERAL
VIEW OF A COMPLETE CODE OF LAWS (n.d.), reprinted in id. at 155, 202–03; JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF THE RATIONALE OF EVIDENCE; FOR THE USE OF NON-LAWYERS AS WELL AS
LAWYERS (1812), reprinted in 6 id. at 1, 63, 508, 522; 7 id. at 579–81.
517 See Mary Sokol, Jeremy Bentham on Love and Marriage: A Utilitarian Proposal for Short-Term
Marriage, 30 J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (2009).
516
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was not just a rationalist apologia for traditional Christian family values or a
naturalist smokescreen for personal religious beliefs. They defended traditional
family norms not out of confessional faith but out of rational proof, not just
because they uncritically believed in them but because they worked.
It was precisely this rational, utilitarian, and even pragmatic defense of the
natural configuration of marriage and family life that made it so appealing to
modern English and American jurists as they sought to create a common law of
marriage that no longer depended on ecclesiastical law, church courts, or
theological arguments. Particularly in America, the disestablishment of
religion mandated by the federal and state constitutions made direct appeals to
the Bible and to Christian theology an insufficient ground by itself for cogent
legal arguments concerning marriage.518 Even in England, which retained its
Anglican establishment, many common lawyers were equally eager to cast
their argument in the natural and utilitarian terms of the Enlightenment, rather
than the biblical and theological terms of the tradition. It was one thing to say
that “Christianity is part of the common law,” as Anglo-American lawyers had
long said.519 It was quite another thing to say that the common law is part of
Christianity. That would simply not do. The Enlightenment philosophical
defense of sex, marriage, and family norms was thus attractive to the common
lawyers.
For example, William Blackstone (1723–1780), the leading English
common lawyer of the eighteenth century, adverted regularly to these natural
518 See sources in JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT 57–63, 71–108 (3d ed. 2011).
519 See, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 552–54 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co.
3d ed. 1874). Cooley wrote:

It is frequently said that Christianity is a part of the law of the land. In a certain sense and for
certain purposes this is true. The best features of the common law, and especially those which
regard the family and social relations; which compel the parent to support the child, the husband
to support the wife; which make the marriage-tie permanent and forbid polygamy,—if not
derived from, have at least been improved and strengthened by the prevailing religion and the
teachings of its sacred Book. But the law does not attempt to enforce the precepts of Christianity
on the ground of their sacred character or divine origin. Some of these precepts, though we may
admit their continual and universal obligation, we must nevertheless recognize as being incapable
of enforcement by human laws. . . . [C]hristianity is not a part of the law of the land in any sense
which entitles the courts to take notice of and base their judgments upon it, except so far as they
can find that its precepts and principles have been incorporated in and made a component part of
the positive law of the State.
Id. at 552; see also Stuart Banner, When Christianity Was Part of the Common Law, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 27,
27 (1998).
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law writings in his influential Commentaries on the Law of England.520 Citing
Grotius, Pufendorf, Montesquieu, and others, Blackstone argued that exclusive
and enduring monogamous marriages were the best way to ensure paternal
certainty and joint parental investment in children who are born vulnerable and
utterly dependent on their parents’ mutual care:
Montesquieu has a very just observation upon this head: that the
establishment of marriage in all civilized states is built on this natural
obligation of the father to provide for his children; for that ascertains
and makes known the person who is bound to fulfil this obligation:
whereas, in promiscuous and illicit conjunctions, the father is
unknown; and the mother finds a thousand obstacles in her way,
shame, remorse, the constraint of her sex, and the rigour of laws, that
stifle her inclinations to perform this duty; and, besides, she generally
wants ability.521

“[T]he duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a
principle of natural law,” Blackstone continued.522 It is “an obligation, says
Puffendorf [sic], laid on them not only by nature herself, but by their own
proper act, in bringing them into the world.”523 “The main end and design of
marriage” he concluded, is “to ascertain and fix upon some certain person, to
whom the care, the protection, the maintenance, and the education of the
children should belong.”524
Much like his fellow Englishmen, William Paley and John Locke,
Blackstone set out in detail the reciprocal rights and duties that the natural law
imposes upon parents and children.525 God and nature have “implant[ed] in the
breast of every parent” an “insuperable degree of affection” for their child once
they are certain the child is theirs, Blackstone wrote.526 The common law
confirms and channels this natural affection by requiring parents to maintain,
protect, and educate their children, and by protecting their rights to discharge
these parental duties against undue interference by others.527 These “natural
dut[ies]” of parents are the correlatives of the natural rights of their children

520

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *432–59.
Id. at *447. This quote is largely a paraphrase of Montesquieu’s writings discussed previously. See
supra notes 274–76 and accompanying text.
522 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 520, at *447.
523 Id.
524 Id. at *455.
525 See supra Part IV.A, V.
526 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 520, at *447.
527 Id. at *446–50.
521
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Blackstone further argued, quoting Grotius.528 Once they become adults,
children acquire reciprocal natural duties toward their parents:
The duties of children to their parents arise from a principle of natural
justice and retribution. For to those who gave us existence we
naturally owe subjection and obedience during our minority, and
honour and reverence ever after: they who protected the weakness of
our infancy are entitled to our protection in the infirmity of their age;
they who by sustenance and education have enabled their offspring to
prosper, ought in return to be supported by that offspring, in case they
stand in need of assistance. Upon this principle proceed all the duties
of children to their parents which are enjoined by positive laws.529

While Blackstone’s views had an enduring influence on the English
common law of marriage, the formulations of United States Supreme Court
Justice Joseph Story (1779–1845) were foundational for American law.530 Like
Blackstone, Story was a student of European natural law theories of marriage,
and he drew heavily on Scottish, English, and continental European
Enlightenment writers in formulating his views.531 Story was also a deep
student of comparative legal history and conflict of laws, and he studded his
writings with all manner of ancient, medieval, and early modern sources on the
origin, nature, and purpose of marriage.
Marriage is treated by all civilized nations as a peculiar and favored
contract. It is in its origin a contract of natural law. . . . It is the
parent, and not the child of society; principium urbis et quasi
seminarium reipublicae [the source of the city, a sort of seminary of
the republic]. In civil society it becomes a civil contract, regulated
and prescribed by law, and endowed with civil consequences. In most
civilized countries, acting under a sense of the force of sacred
obligations, it has had the sanctions of religion superadded. It then
becomes a religious, as well as a natural and civil contract; for it is a
great mistake to suppose, that because it is the one, therefore it may
not likewise be the other.532
528 See id. at *447 (“By begetting them, therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation to
endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life which they bestowed shall be supported and presented, And thus
the children will have the perfect right of receiving maintenance from their parents.”); see also id. at *452
(“The power of the parents over their children is derived from . . . their duty . . . .”).
529 Id. at *453.
530 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD
TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS,
SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS 100–18 (Boston, Hilliard Gray & Co. 1834).
531 Id. at 100–92.
532 Id. at 100.
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Marriage is thus a civil contract dependent in its essence on the mutual
consent of a man and a woman with the freedom and capacity to marry each
other. But marriage is more than “a mere contract,” Story insisted, for it also
has natural, religious, and social dimensions, all of which the positive law of
the state must take into account.533 The state’s positive law of marriage must
reflect the natural law teaching that marriage is a monogamous union
presumptively for life; that marriage channels the strong human sex drive
toward marital sex which serves to deepen the mutual love between husband
and wife; and that marriage provides a stable and lifelong system of support,
protection, and edification for husbands and wives, and parents and children.534
The positive law of the state must also reflect the teachings of nature—
sometimes alone and sometimes with “religion superadded”—that civilized
societies outlaw the practices of polygamy, incest, fornication, adultery, and
light divorce that all violate the other spouse’s natural rights, as well as the acts
of desertion, abuse, neglect, and disinheritance that violate their children’s
natural rights.535 “A heathen nation might justify polygamy, or incest, contracts
of moral turpitude, or exercises of despotic cruelty over persons, which would
be repugnant to the first principles of Christian duty.”536 But not so here, Story
insisted. Normally, America will honor a contract made in a foreign country on
the traditional conflict of laws principle that “if [it is] valid there, it is valid
every where.”537 But “[t]he most prominent, if not the only known exceptions
to this rule, are those respecting polygamy and incest,” since they are
“repugnant to” the public policy of a civilized nation.538
It is just because marriage has all of these natural goods and qualities
embedded within it that it is more than “mere contract,” Story went on.539
While all fit adults have the natural right and liberty to enter into a valid
marriage contract, the form, function, and limits of this marriage contract are
not subject to private bargain but preset by nature and society.540 In almost all
civilizations and legal systems, “marriage is a contract sui generis, and
differing . . . from all other contracts”—indeed, a unique form of covenant.541
533

Id. at 168 (“Marriage is not treated as a mere contract between parties . . . .”).
Id. at 108–99.
535 Id. at 100–12.
536 Id. at 26.
537 Id. at 104.
538 Id. at 104–05. Story wrote further, “Christianity is understood to prohibit polygamy and incest; and
therefore no Christian country would recognise polygamy, or incestuous marriages.” Id. at 104.
539 Id. at 168.
540 Id. at 101–02.
541 Id. at 101.
534
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Story quoted at length from a Scottish case that distilled the views of Home,
Hutcheson, Hume, and others:
The contract of marriage is the most important of all human
transactions. It is the very basis of the whole fabric of civilized
society. The status of marriage is juris gentium [part of the common
law of nations], and the foundation of it, like that of all other
contracts, rests on the consent of parties. But it differs from other
contracts in this, that the rights, obligations, or duties, arising from it,
are not left entirely to be regulated by the agreements of parties, but
are, to a certain extent, matters of municipal regulation, over which
the parties have no control, by any declaration of their will. It confers
the status of legitimacy on children born in wedlock, with all the
consequential rights, duties, and privileges, thence arising; it gives
rise to the relations of consanguinity and affinity; in short, it pervades
the whole system of civil society. Unlike other contracts, it cannot, in
general, amongst civilized nations, be dissolved by mutual consent;
and it subsists in full force, even although one of the parties should be
for ever rendered incapable, as in the case of incurable insanity, or
the like, from performing his part of the mutual contract.
No wonder that the rights, duties, and obligations, arising from
so important a contract, should not be left to the discretion or caprice
of the contracting parties, but should be regulated, in many important
particulars, by the laws of every civilized country. . . . [M]any of the
rights, duties, and obligations, arising from it, are so important to the
best interests of morality and good government, that the parties have
no control over them; but they are regulated and enforced by the
public law . . . .542

This was a common argument among Anglo-American common lawyers in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Not only did they draw on the
same Scottish, English, and continental European writers to defend the natural
law configuration of marriage and the natural law prohibition on various sex
crimes. They also, like Story, treated marriage as a multidimensional
institution that discharged multiple goods for husbands and wives, parents and
children, and society and the state alike.
Chancellor James Kent (1763–1847) of New York, for example, one of the
great early systematizers of American law alongside Story, lifted up the civil,
natural, and religious dimensions of marriage in his 1826 Commentaries on
American Law:
542

Id. at 101–03 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The primary and most important of the domestic relations, is that of
husband and wife. It has its foundation in nature, and is the only
lawful relation by which Providence has permitted the continuance of
the human race. In every age it has [had] a propitious influence on the
moral improvement and happiness of mankind. It is one of the chief
foundations of social order. We may justly place to the credit of the
institution of marriage, a great share of the blessings which flow from
refinement of manners, the education of children, the sense of justice,
and the cultivation of the liberal arts.543

Citing Pufendorf, Paley, and various Scottish writers, Kent then worked
systematically and at some length through their by now familiar arguments for
exclusive and enduring monogamous marriage and family life, and against
incest, polygamy, extramarital sex, and easy divorce.544
A couple of generations later, Leonard Shelford (1795–1864), an English
common law authority often used in America, combined the early modern
natural theories of marriage of his day with those of the classical Roman
lawyers.545 Shelford started with the Stoic formulation of Modestinus that
marriage is “the union of a man and a woman, a partnership for life involving
divine as well as human law.”546 The Romans were largely content to make
such categorical statements about marriage, Shelford pointed out, without
theoretically elaborating them.547 But the Western tradition has, since Roman
times, come to understand that monogamous, lifelong marriages are naturally
designed to foster the good of the couple and their children, the church and the
state, and the society and its morals at once.548 After quoting several English
and Scottish authorities, Shelford wrote:
From various learned authors it may be inferred that marriage is,
according to the primitive law of God and Nature, for the mutual help
of husband and wife—the propagation of the human race—the
educating and instructing of their children in the fear and love of
God, and training them to be useful members of society. It is a
solemn contract, whereby a man and a woman, for their mutual
benefit, and the procreation of children, engage to live in a kind and
affectionate manner . . . . Besides the procreation and education of
543

2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 75 (New York, O. Halsted 2d ed. 1832).
Id. at 75–188.
545 See LEONARD SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
REGISTRATION AS ALTERED BY THE RECENT STATUTES 1–5 (London, S. Sweet 1841).
546 See id. at 1 (quoting same in Latin).
547 Id. at 1–5.
548 Id. at 2–3.
544
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children, marriage has for its object the mutual society, help, and
comfort that the one ought to have of the other, both in prosperity and
adversity. Marriage is the most solemn engagement which one human
being can contract with another. It is a contract formed with a view
not only to the benefit of the parties themselves, but to the benefit of
third parties; to the benefit of their common offspring, and to the
moral order of civil society.549

All this is “confirmed and enforced by the Holy Scriptures,” Shelford
added, citing the famous passages in Genesis 2, Matthew 19, and
Ephesians 5.550 But the state is not heavily involved in the regulation of
marriage because it wants to establish biblical truths, Shelford continued, but
rather to preserve the public and private goods of marriage.551
“[N]otwithstanding the origin and divine institution of marriage, human
legislatures have very properly assumed the power of regulating the exercise of
the right of marriage, on account of its leading to relations, duties, and
consequences, materially affecting the welfare and peace of society.” Because
of this, “[i]t has been the policy of legislatures, proceeding on the ground that
marriage is the origin of all relations, and consequently the first element of all
social duties, to preserve the sacred nature of this contract.”552
A couple of generations later, distinguished American jurist W.C. Rodgers
opened his oft-reprinted treatise on the law of domestic relations with a
veritable homily on marriage that made use of arguments based both on nature
and what he called the “Divine plan.”553 Notice the ease with which he sets out
the basic argument for the natural configuration of marriage and family life:

549 Id. For an elaboration of this argument, see FREDERIC R. COUDERT, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LAWS IN
EUROPE: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION 1–15 (New York, Livingston Middleditch Co. 1893), who,
also starting with Modestinus’s definition of marriage, shows the continuity of marital norms across classical
Roman law, medieval civil law and canon law, and early modern civil law and common law. See also
CHARLES FRANKLIN THWING & CARRIE F. BUTLER THWING, THE FAMILY: AN HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL STUDY
3–6 (Lee & Shepard Co. rev. ed. 1913) (1886).
550 SHELFORD, supra note 545, at 4.
551 Id.
552 Id.; see also FRANK H. KEEZER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 73–75 (2d ed.
1923). “Marriage is universal; it is founded on the law of nature.” Id. at 73. He noted that some “claim that
marriage is of divine origin, others that it is the natural outgrowth of society. While the law does not expressly
recognize its religious character it does recognize it as the most important of domestic relations and in most
countries it has had the sanction of religion superadded.” Id. at 75. “[But marriage is] at law treated as a
contract creating a status, and not in any controlling sense as a sacrament.” Id. at 73–74.
553 W.C. RODGERS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 2 (Chicago, T.H. Flood & Co.
1899).
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In a sense, it is a consummation of the Divine command to “multiply
and replenish the earth.” It is the state of existence ordained by the
Creator, who has fashioned man and woman expressly for the society
and enjoyment incident to mutual companionship. This Divine plan is
supported and prompted by the natural instinct, as it were, on the part
of both for the society of each other. It is the highest state of
existence in the most polished condition of man. All living creatures
are made male and female; but it is for man only to live in a state of
matrimony, and for him alone to guard and perpetuate marriage as
practiced and sanctioned by all civilized people from the earliest
times. The lower animals know nothing of the state, and it only exists
imperfectly in savage life. All writers . . . proclaim it the only stable
substructure of our social, civil and religious institutions. Religion,
government, morals, progress, enlightened learning and domestic
happiness must all fall into most certain and inevitable decay when
the married state ceases to be recognized or respected. Accordingly,
we have in this state of man and woman the most essential foundation
of religion, social purity and domestic happiness.554

This thick multidimensional understanding of marriage informed many
judicial opinions of the nineteenth century as well. Marriage law treatises at the
turn of the twentieth century devoted many pages to citations to and quotations
from state and lower federal cases that made the same point that marriage,
while rooted in contract, was a multidimensional institution that served public
and private goods at once. Such views occasionally reached the United States
Supreme Court, too, which spoke repeatedly of marriage as “more than a
[mere] contract”555 and “a sacred obligation.”556 In Murphy v. Ramsey, for
example, one of a series of Supreme Court cases upholding anti-polygamy
laws against Mormon religious freedom arguments, Justice Matthews declared
for the Court:
For certainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and
necessary in the founding of a free, self-governing
commonwealth . . . than that which seeks to establish it on the basis
of the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing from the
union for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate of
matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our
civilization; the best guaranty of that reverent morality which is the

554

Id.
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 213 (1888).
556 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 343 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878); see
also Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885) (referring to marriage as a “holy estate”).
555
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The Court argued similarly in Maynard v. Hill, a case upholding a new
state law on divorce and holding that marriage is not a “contract” for purposes
of interpreting the prohibition in Article I, Section 10 of the United States
Constitution: “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts.”558 After rehearsing at length various authorities of the day, Justice
Field declared for the Court:
[W]hilst marriage is often termed . . . a civil contract—generally to
indicate that it must be founded upon the agreement of the parties,
and does not require any religious ceremony for its solemnization—it
is something more than a mere contract. The consent of the parties is
of course essential to its existence, but when the contract to marry is
executed by the marriage, a relation between the parties is created
which they cannot change. Other contracts may be modified,
restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the
parties. Not so with marriage. The relation once formed, the law steps
in and holds the parties to various obligations and liabilities. It is an
institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is
deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.559

Following Protestant conventions of the day, Anglo-American jurists and
judges in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries frequently used the term
“covenant” to distill this common notion that marriage is a contract, but
something more than “a mere contract.”560 Cases and treatises of the day
regularly spoke of “the marriage covenant,” “the covenant of marriage,” the
covenantal “duties” of marriage, “the most solemn and binding character” of a
marriage covenant, the “sanction,” “natural relationship,” “natural union,” and
“indissoluble bond of the marriage” covenant.561 Such terminology

557

114 U.S. at 45.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
559 125 U.S. at 210–11.
560 See, e.g., THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, ESSAY ON DIVORCE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION 96, 196–97, 217,
235, 256 (New York, Charles Scribner & Co. 1869).
561 See Morehouse v. Morehouse, 39 A. 516, 519 (Conn. 1898); Woodward v. Shaw, 18 Me. 304, 308
(1841); Little v. Gibson, 39 N.H. 505 (1859); Hickle v. Hickle, 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 552 (1892); H. HENSLEY
HENSON, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 12, 51, 59 (1910); JOHN WILLIAMS MORRIS, OBSERVATIONS ON THE
MARRIAGE LAWS 150, 159–63, 194, 277, 320, 338 (London, J. Hatchard 1815); EDWIN H. WOODRUFF, A
SELECTION OF CASES ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND THE LAW OF PERSONS 240 (1905).
558
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underscored that the marital agreement had special qualities that went beyond
the mutual consent and mutual promises of the couple.
In the nineteenth century, Anglo-American common lawyers also came to
use the term “status” as something of a synonym for the term “covenant.”562
“Status” was a term that English legal historian Sir Henry Sumner Maine
(1822–1888) had made famous in his provocative theory that the law of
Victorian England altogether was moving “from Status to Contract.”563 Many
American jurists accepted the concept of marriage as a “status,” without
buying Maine’s broader argument that marriage law was moving from “status
to contract.”564 Perhaps that movement could be seen in other areas of law
where private contract was on the rise, American jurists argued, but the
opposite was true in the law of marriage.
Joel Bishop (1814–1901), a leading American family law jurist, put it thus:
[Marriage is] a civil status, existing in one man and one woman,
legally united for life, for those civil and social purposes which are
founded in the distinction of sex. Its source is the law of nature,
whence it has flowed into the municipal laws of every laws of every
civilized country, and into the general law of nations. . . . [M]arriage
may be said to proceed from a civil contract between one man and
one woman, of the needful physical and civil capacity. While the
contract remains executory, that is, an agreement to marry, it differs
in no essential particulars from other civil contracts . . . . But when it
becomes executed in what the law recognizes as a valid marriage, its
nature as a contract is merged in the higher nature of the status.565

The state law of matrimony, Bishop continued, fixes the terms of the marriage
contract in accordance with the dictates of nature, morality, and society.566
Parties are free to accept or reject these basic terms, but they cannot rescind,
condition, or modify them if they wish to enter a valid marriage.567 And, once
they marry, their status of being married is presumptively permanent and
562

HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 164–65 (Henry Holt & Co. 4th ed. 1906) (1861).
Id. at 165.
564 For studies of Maine’s variant influence on Anglo-American legal and political thought, see R.C.J.
COCKS, SIR HENRY MAINE: A STUDY IN VICTORIAN JURISPRUDENCE (1988); PAUL VINOGRADOFF, THE
TEACHING OF SIR HENRY MAINE (1904); and Mark Francis, H.S. Maine: Victorian Evolution and Political
Theory, 19 HIST. EUR. IDEAS 753 (1994).
565 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, AND EVIDENCE IN
MATRIMONIAL SUITS 25 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 2d ed. 1856).
566 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, AND EVIDENCE IN
MATRIMONIAL SUITS 27–28 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1852).
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exclusive and carries with it built-in obligations of support and care for spouse,
child, and other loved ones that continue even after death.568 Marital parties
cannot dissolve this union on their own ipse dixit, nor simply walk away from
their obligations with impunity.569 The voluntarily assumed legal status of
being a husband, wife, father, or mother is something that stays with them,
even if they separate or divorce.570 The law still expects them to support and
cooperate with each other in the care of their children and sometimes to
support each other through payment of alimony.571 And, even after death, the
marital status of the decedent creates testamentary presumptions in favor of the
surviving spouse, children, and natural kin.572
American jurist, James Schouler (1839–1920), put it succinctly in his
authoritative 1921 treatise on domestic relations:
This [marital] contract of the parties is simply to enter into a certain
status or relation. The rights and obligations of that status are fixed
by society in accordance with principles of natural law, and are
beyond and above the parties themselves. They may make
settlements and regulate the property rights of each other; but they
cannot modify the terms upon which they are to live together, nor
superadd to the relation a single condition. Being once bound they are
bound forever. Mutual consent, as in all contracts, brings them
together; but mutual consent cannot part them.573

By the early twentieth century, this idea that marriage was a special civil
status, defined by law, but entered into by voluntary contract, became the
preferred common law formula.574 Jurists and judges of the day used the term
“marriage as status” as a short-hand formula to signify several features of
marriage at once: (1) that marriage was a multidimensional institution, at once
a contractual, natural, social, moral, economic, and religious in origin and
orientation; (2) that marriage was both a private institution rooted in the
consent of the parties, and a public institution directed to the goods of the
568

Id.
Id. at 472.
570 Id. at 32.
571 Id. at 526.
572 See JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, AND EVIDENCE
IN MATRIMONIAL SUITS 272 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 6th rev. ed. 1881).
573 2 JAMES SCHOULER & ARTHUR W. BLAKEMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE,
SEPARATION, AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 1073, at 1346 (6th ed. 1921).
574 See, e.g., EPAPHRODITUS PECK, THE LAW OF PERSONS OR DOMESTIC RELATIONS 3–4 (1913);
RODGERS, supra note 553, at 2–5; WALTER C. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 4–7 (St. Paul, West Publ’g Co. 1896).
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couple, their children, and the broader communities of which they were a part;
(3) that marriage was predetermined in its form, permanent in its obligations,
and preclusive of any other sexual or marital relation; and (4) that marriage
defined a person’s status and standing in society, and vested them with the
special rights and duties that became that status.575
“The doctrine that marriage is a status is modern,” wrote the distinguished
American jurist William Nelson in 1895.576 By calling marriage a “status,” the
American common law had settled on a halfway step between the traditional
notion that “marriage was a sacrament to be solemnized by a religious
ceremony of the church regardless of the faith of the parties” and the modern
notion that marriage was merely a private “civil contract” in which the public
has no interest.577 Marriage was a contract, but it was also more than a
contract, Nelson insisted.578 Marriage was not a sacrament, but it did embrace
some of the same qualities of faithfulness, exclusivity, and permanence that
typified sacramental and covenantal marriages since the time of Augustine.579
Religious communities could add requirements to the “civil status” of
marriage for their own voluntary faithful to abide, Nelson and others
continued, but not subtract from them. They could, for example, prohibit
interreligious marriages or divorce and remarriage, as Catholics do. They could
insist on various forms of premarital preparation and liturgical celebration, as
some Protestants do. They could even insist on detailed prenuptial contracts
about property and inheritance, as some Jews do. But all these enhancements
have to be consistent with the core forms and norms of marriage prescribed by
state law and rooted in common human nature and natural law. Religious
communities have no right, for example, to permit polygamy among their
members, as Mormons and Muslims sometimes do. They have no business
forcing couples to marry sight unseen, as some Indian Hindus and Native
American Indians do. Nor do they have the right to endanger the health and

575 See TIFFANY, supra note 574, at 4–7. For modern expositions on the continued importance of status in
American family law, see MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY (2000), and MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS
OF MARRIAGE (1999).
576 1 WILLIAM T. NELSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE 5
(Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1895).
577 Id. at 5; see also id. at 5–8 (discussing how the term “status” resulted from a conflict of opinion
surrounding the sacramental definition of marriage); JOSEPH R. LONG, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 3–10 (3d ed. 1923).
578 NELSON, supra note 576, at 5–8.
579 Id. at 5.
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happiness of their children through hard labor, severe corporal discipline, faith
healing, or comparable intrusions on the natural rights of the child. Religious
communities can add to natural and positive laws governing the core civil
status of marriage and family life. But they may not subtract or detract from
them, even in the name of religious freedom.580
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The story of this Article will surprise some readers. Some will be surprised
that pre-Enlightenment Christian writers developed elaborate natural law and
natural rights theories of sex, marriage, and family life, independently of the
Bible, and sometimes in sharp critique of particular biblical teachings and
practices. The common assumption is that Christian theories of marriage and
family life were spiritual through and through and thus happily dispensable in
our post-modern, post-establishment of religion era. Some will be surprised
that several of the famous philosophers associated with the Western
Enlightenment embraced traditional Christian teachings about sex, marriage,
and family, and then worked hard to prove and improve this inheritance with
elaborate arguments from nature, reason, custom, fairness, and utility. The
common assumption is that the Western Enlightenment had denounced the
Western Christian tradition for privileging church over state, Scripture over
reason, men over women, chastity over sex, procreation über alles. And some
readers will be surprised that the Anglo-American common lawyers of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries drew directly on this rich natural law
theory in devising the idea of marriage as a valuable status that deserves to be
privileged and in denouncing incest, polygamy, adultery, fornication, and easy
divorce as dangerous deviations from natural and social order. The common
assumption is that Anglo-American lawyers by this time were legal positivists
who had no room for such speculative natural law inquiries; hadn’t Oliver
Wendell Holmes finally and fully dismissed natural law as a “brooding
omnipresence in the sky” with no earthly value or legal validity?581
The reality, however, is that from roughly 1600 to 1900, the Western legal
tradition—and in particular the Anglo-American common law tradition that
has been our focus—embraced and enhanced the natural law configuration of
marriage and family life that had been adumbrated by Aristotle, elaborated by
580 See CHARLES CAVERNO, TREATISE ON DIVORCE 22–24 (Madison, Midland Publ’g Co. 1889); see also
A.P. RICHARD, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (Chicago, Rand McNally & Co. 1889).
581 See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Thomas Aquinas and Francisco Vitoria, and then appropriated and expanded
by Enlightenment liberals and jurists. The heart of the argument is that
exclusive and enduring monogamous marriages are the best way to ensure
paternal certainty and essential joint parental investment in fragile and
dependent children. If men and women could have random sex with anyone,
men would not only exploit women mercilessly to gratify their sexual drives
but they would also ignore their children since they would have no certainty of
their paternity. If men did not invest in the care of their children, many of those
children would suffer or die, particularly as infants, when their mothers were
weakened from childbirth and lack of sleep and least capable of caring for all
her children and herself as well. Thus, the natural law inclines the human
species to center their sexual and procreative activities within the marital
household. It further inclines a mother to bond deeply with her child during
pregnancy and nursing, and to nourish and protect the child until it has grown.
And it inclines a father to bond with a child that he knows is his own, that
looks like him, that is an extension and creation of his being, substance, or
genes, and that can carry on his name, work, property, and legacy.
The natural law tradition presupposed that husbands and wives had to work
hard to maintain active and healthy sex lives—even when, indeed especially
when, procreation was not or was no longer possible. Robust sexual
communication within marriage is essential for couples to deepen their marital
love and to remain in their own marital beds, rather than testing their
neighbor’s. And marital sex sometimes is even more important when the
marital home is (newly) empty and husbands and wives depend more centrally
on each other (not on their children) for emotional confirmation and
fulfillment. Not every sexual act within the marital bed needs to be procreative,
the tradition taught. Sexual intimacy between married couples is an essential
good in its own right, regardless of procreative intent, capacity, or result. The
rigid procreative perfectionism and narrow reduction of sexual intimacy to
intercourse alone, featured in some modern Christian theories of natural law,
do not reflect the many traditional natural law teachings that marital sex is a
good, gift, and blessing in its own right.
This natural law tradition emphasized that parents and children have
reciprocal natural rights and natural duties vis-à-vis each other. Rather than
simply pretending that children can thrive equally well with wet nurses and
orphanages, with random bottle-holders and community care-takers, the
natural law tradition emphasized the vital organic bonds between mother,
father, and child. It stipulated that the man and woman who produce a child
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should have the prima facie right and duty to care for that child. And it
emphasized that children have the correlative right to be raised, if possible, by
the parents who procreate them—or in some cases, those who adopt them. This
teaching about the rights and duties of parents and children is not only a
feature of classical, Christian, and Enlightenment natural law theories, but it
has been reasserted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and many of
its successor documents, including the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child.582
The natural law tradition also emphasized that exclusive and enduring
monogamous marriages are the best way to ensure that men and women are
treated with the equal dignity and respect, and that husbands and wives, and
parents and children, provide each other with mutual support and protection
throughout their lifetimes. If husbands can just walk away from their wives
once they have produced children, if wives can just walk away from their
husbands if they become injured or impotent, if children can just abandon their
families once they have been emancipated, or if parents can just ignore their
emancipated children even when they have great need, too many parties are
left vulnerable and dependent on the charity of others. The natural law thus
inclines humans to remain bonded to their marriages and families, and to care
for their natural kin throughout their lives, even at ample personal sacrifice.
Finally, the natural law tradition discouraged many other types of sexual
activities and interactions that jeopardized the stability and support of the
marital household. Polygamy was out because it fractures marital trust and
troth, harms wives and children, privileges patriarchy and sexual slavery, and
foments male lust and adultery. Polyandry was out because it creates paternal
uncertainty and catalyzes male rivalry to the ultimate detriment of the children.
Incest was out because it overrides the instincts of natural revulsion, it weakens
bloodlines, and it deters the creation of new kinship networks. Prostitution and
fornication were out because they often exploit women, foster libertinism,
deter marriage, and produce dependent bastards. Adultery was out for some of
the same reasons, but even more because it shatters marital fidelity and trust,
diffuses family resources and parental energy, and risks sexual disease and
physical retaliation of the betrayed spouse. Easy divorce was out because it
erodes marital fidelity and investment, jeopardizes long-term spousal support
and care, and squanders family property on which children eventually depend
582 See John Witte, Jr. & Don S. Browning, Christianity’s Mixed Contributions to Children’s Rights:
Traditional Teachings, Modern Doubts, 61 EMORY L.J. 991 (2012).
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to care for their elderly parents. By the turn of the twentieth century, similar
natural law and natural rights arguments were being used to begin to stamp out
the discrimination that the common law still retained against spinsters, wives,
and illegitimate children.
Even the most robust natural law theorists, however, whether traditional
Christians or post-Christian Enlightenment liberals, understood that the natural
law of sex, marriage, and family could not do it all. For the natural law is not
and cannot be self-executing. The natural law might well incline humans to
behave in certain ways in their sex, marriage, and family lives, and many
humans in fact generally follow these inclinations without much further
prompting. But given our human natures—and the Jekylls and Hydes that
perilously vie within each of us—natural inclinations, by themselves, are pretty
wobbly, and can produce only a shaky normative framework. The reality is
that a good number of folks stray on occasion from what might be considered
to be the naturally licit and socially expedient sexual path for the human
species. And some folks stray all the time, harming themselves and many
others along the way. The natural law thus also needs the positive law of the
state for stability—to teach these basic norms of sex, marriage, and family life
to the community, to encourage and facilitate citizens to live in accordance
with them, to nudge and incentivize sexual and marital behavior that caters to
private and public goods, and to redirect and rehabilitate those citizens who
wander too far. The nineteenth-century American common law notion of
marriage and the household as a good and desirable “status” that the state
should support captures this insight that natural law and positive law must
work together to create fair and stable sex, marriage, and family lives for
citizens.
Natural law not only needs the positive laws of the state to teach and
enforce its norms on sex, marriage, and family life. It also needs broader
communities and narratives to stabilize, deepen, and improve these norms. It
depends on deeper models and exemplars of love and faithfulness, trust and
sacrifice, commitment and community to give its teachings content and
coherence. It depends on other stable institutions besides the state (churches,
synagogues, schools, charities, hospitals, neighborhoods, and others) and other
stable professionals besides lawyers (preachers, teachers, doctors, mentors,
counselors, therapists, and others). The marital household is a
multidimensional institution, and it depends upon multiple value systems and
multiple institutions to be fully stable and functional.
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Historically, pre-Christian Greeks and Romans, Catholic and Protestant
theologians and jurists, and post-Christian liberal philosophers and common
lawyers alike supported this integrated framework of sex, marriage, and family
life, all drawing in part on common arguments about human nature, natural
law, and natural rights. Enlightenment liberals, in particular—for all their
post-Christian, and sometimes anti-Christian zeal—supported the traditional
marital family as the most natural, expedient, and desirable form and forum of
domestic life. Enlightenment liberals warned against the dangers of condoning
“sexual libertinism” and allowing society to slide into a sexual state of nature
without much law. They warned against the destruction of the marital
household, for that would spell the “doom of all mortals.”583 But what both
liberals and traditionalists long tried to integrate, modern society has
increasingly come to separate. In the past two generations, the West has seen
ever greater separations between marriage and sex; between marriage and
childbirth; between marriage and child rearing; between childbirth and
parenting; between sex and physical contact (with the advent of the virtual
world); and between childbirth, sexual intercourse, and biological filiation
(with the introduction of IVF technology, surrogacy, and sperm banks).584
I stand firmly in support of modern liberty and deplore much of the
patriarchy, paternalism, and plain prudishness of the past. I stand firmly in
support of modern equality and applaud the great advances made of late on
behalf of the rights of women, children, gays and lesbians, and many others
who long faced chronic discrimination, deprivation, and exploitation. But I
also stand firmly in support of the traditional marital household as a natural
and necessary institution for the cultivation and preservation of the very
ordered liberty and social stability that seems to be eroding today. And I
believe that the natural law configuration of sex, marriage, and family life still
provides enduring wisdom and instruction for a post-Christian and postmodern
Western culture that remains dedicated to the liberty and equality of its
citizens.
Even if we now reject “natural law” today as old-fashioned, statist,
essentialist, artificial, or out of touch with evolutionary or political realities, the
basic facts of human nature and human sexuality have not changed. We
humans still have perennial sex drives, especially when we are younger and
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more fertile. We are still social creatures who crave stable intimate
relationships over time. We still produce fragile babies who remain deeply
dependent on their parents and other adults for a very long time. We still find
that most women bond with children much more readily than do men—unless
they know they are the fathers.
To be sure, some of the scientific assumptions at work in traditional natural
law teachings about the marital household have changed. Genetic testing has
made paternity easier to establish. Contraceptives have made extramarital sex
safer to pursue. And artificial reproductive technology has made single
reproduction a greater possibility. But these scientific advances are by no
means universally available, nor are they foolproof when available. And while
they can enhance the sexual experiences and activities of humans, these
scientific advances do not alter the core logic at work in the natural law
configuration of marriage. Confining sex to marriage was important in earlier
times to ensure paternal certainty, but the point of having paternal certainty
was to ensure that a man could and would invest in the care of his child and its
mother, ideally in a stable marital household. Using contraceptives certainly
widens the opportunities for safe and secret extramarital sex, but it does not
meet the traditional concern that rampant promiscuity often leads to sexual
exploitation of women and unhealthy sexual libertinism among men. Having
artificial reproductive technology (ART) available certainly enhances the
chances of having a child on one’s own or with one’s spouse, but when a
mother has drawn from an anonymous sperm bank or a frozen embryo
collection, her child’s long-term concerns for its origin and identity remain
unmet. There are many valuable uses for paternity tests, contraceptives, and
ART in modern society, notably among married couples whose lives can be
greatly enhanced by them. But these modern scientific advances do not, in my
view, undercut the core logic of the natural configuration of marriage.
Also, to be sure, the modern welfare state now supplies nonmarital
children, single mothers, abandoned spouses, and aged parents with vast new
resources traditionally supplied principally by their own natural kin and natural
family networks. These, too, are valuable advances that promote social justice
and greater happiness for all. But the availability of social welfare relief does
not cancel the ongoing value of stable marital households and natural family
networks. The modern welfare state remains an expensive and risky modern
experiment: it’s less than a century old, and it’s not clear that this is a
sustainable long term solution even for the affluent West, let alone for
underdeveloped or developing countries. Moreover, even in America today,
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while state funding is still amply at hand, those who depend exclusively on
social welfare, Medicare, social security, and other entitlements often face
bitter financial and emotional hardship, and endless bureaucratic wrangling as
they seek to secure basic food, health care, and job stability. Better social
welfare systems are in place in Europe today. But these, too, depend on high
median wealth in the population, all of which can disappear quickly, as we just
saw during the Great Recession and our (grand)parents saw in the Great
Depression. The modern social welfare state should be seen as a supplement
to, not a substitute for, the intergenerational care and nurture provided by
stable families and natural kin structures.
The real challenge today is to find ways of harmonizing the wisdom of the
classical, Christian, and liberal traditions with the realities, conditions, and
needs of the postmodern family. We cannot wax nostalgic about a prior golden
age of marriage and the family, nor can we wax myopic about modern ideals of
liberty, privacy, and autonomy. We cannot be blind to the patriarchy,
paternalism, and plain prudishness of the past, nor can we be blind to the
massive social, psychological, and spiritual costs of the modern sexual
revolution. Participants in the conversation on marriage must seek to
understand both traditional morals and contemporary mores on their own terms
and in their own context—without deprecating or privileging either form or
norm. Traditionalists must heed the maxim of Jaroslav Pelikan that “[t]radition
is the living faith of the dead; traditionalism is the dead faith of the living.”585
Wooden antiquarianism, a dogmatic indifference to the changing needs of
marriages and families, is not apt. Modernists must heed the instruction of
Harold Berman that “we must walk into the future with an eye on the past.”586
Chronological snobbery, a calculated disregard for the wisdom of the past, also
is not apt. I have tried to retrieve some of this past wisdom in this Article. In
later articles and books, I hope to reconstruct this wisdom in a way that is
useful for the law and culture of the twenty-first century family.
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